You are here

Issues for governance


The Consensus Delusion (Part #5)


[Parts: First | Prev | Next | Last | All] [Links: To-K | From-K | From-Kx | Refs ]


  • Critical issues for governance: Specific examples of domains in which consensus is improbable include:


    Whilst these issues may be variously recognized or denied, any global consensus on effective action is highly improbable. Such issues continue, however to be the subject of heated debate -- reminiscent of the challenge of global warming itself (Sins of Hot Air Emission, Omission, Commission and Promission: the political challenge of responding to global crises, 2009).

  • Sustainable governance: Much is made of the quest for sustainable governance and the regrettable behaviour of those who impede its emergence. In practice it is in opposition to the latter that the most consensus is achieved -- however limited the insight into what might be proposed, as argued by George Monbiot (We know what to march against on 26 March; here's what to protest for, The Guardian, 6 March 2011). Little is asked about the potentially delusional nature of the assumptions by which that quest is currently framed by the international community.

    Is the psychosocial system inherently ungovernable -- as every trend would imply (Ungovernability of Sustainable Global Democracy? 2010)? What might be the characteristics of emergent forms of governance bypassing the conventional assumptions of governance, as separately explored (Consciously Self-reflexive Global Initiatives: Renaissance zones, complex adaptive systems, and third order organizations, 2007)?

    As with the Pax Romana and Pax Britannica, the success of the Pax Americana can simply be proclaimed through skillful use of public relations. Consensus on that achievement with respect to sustainable governance can simply be declared -- and woe to those who deny it. The classic tale of the Emperor's New Clothes offers insights into the nature of such consensus and the dilemmas it poses (Entangled Tales of Memetic Disaster: mutual implication of the Emperor and the Little Boy, 2009).

  • Alternative strategies: The movements promoting such strategies are explicit in cultivating a consensus regarding future possibilities as a remedy for current planetary and social ills. Whilst often visibly effective in demonstrating their opposition to the conventional consensus, they have proven to be much challenged in reframing their own dysfunctional dynamics. To that degree they have proven unsuccessful in embodying the consensus to which they variously aspire -- thereby allowing their opponents to argue successfully that it is a delusion.

    The potential of the various calls for "new thinking" to address this failure also merits consideration (From Changing the Strategic Game to Changing the Strategic Frame: missing cognitive possibility in changing the system not the planet, 2010). This is also evident in the Urgent Appeal to Change the Mindset (March 2011) launched by the Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development Perspectives.

    Curiously the argument for "new thinking" has now been reinforced -- form a different perspective -- by a leader editorial in The Economist (Welcome to the Anthropocene: Humans have changed the way the world works. Now they have to change the way they think about it, too, 26 May 2011).

  • Rule of law: It is appropriate to ask whether the plethora of international conventions is as much a symptom of the consensus delusion as a manifestation of effective global consensus building. There is an increasing body of evidence that respect for the rule of law, even at the highest level, is ever more tokenistic and more a feature of public relations. The point continues to be made in periodic reports on the abuse of human rights. Examples include the level of extraordinary rendition through which people are abducted and transferred extrajudicially from one nation to another for the purpose of "interrogation" -- with the official complicity of both. The widespread breach of international treaties, whether alleged or confirmed, offers another example (Alleged Breach of UN Treaty Obligations by US, 2010) -- as does the pattern of extrajudicial execution, acclaimed as "justice".

    The pattern of extrajudicial initiatives is increasingly seen as a "normal" strategic option -- most notably by the US and its allies, who see themselves as free to operate "above the law" when convenient to do so. This reinforces the more general point that the widespread incidence of crime, tax evasion and illegal bribery, all demonstrate the improbability of the global rule of law. Again it is remarkable with respect to the International Criminal Court that it is the US and Israel who have "unsigned" their original signatures of the Rome Statute, indicating that they no longer have legal obligations arising from their former representatives' signature of the statute. With respect to the distinct International Court of Justice, the US withdrew from its compulsory jurisdiction in 1986, and only accepts that jurisdiction when convenient to its interests. Within the framework of any purported global consensus, it then becomes difficult to distinguish between "outlaw", "terrorist", "criminal", "covert extrajudical operations" and "freedom fighter".

    The point is remarkably well made by the "justice" with which Osama bin Laden was executed and the pre-judgment and "show trial" of Dominique Strauss-Kahn (Iconic Extrajudicial Execution of Jesus through Osama by US? 2011; Pre-Judging an Institution's Implicit Strategy by the Director's Private Behaviour, 2011). These contrast with the inability to bring Henry Kissinger and Warren Anderson to international justice for crimes against humanity (Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, 2001).

    The emergence of an increasingly delusional nature of any international legal consensus has been succinctly expressed with respect to the neocon strategy of governance, as presented by Ron Suskind (Without a Doubt, The New York Times, In The Magazine, 17 October 2004) following an exchange he had with an aide in the decision-making circle of President Bush:

    The aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.'' I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's not the way the world really works anymore,'' he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."

    Most striking is the extent to which declarations and resolutions of collective intent have very short "half-lives" -- if they in fact "live" at all.

  • Global ethics and universal values: The variety of understandings and appreciations of human "values" notably effects any possibility of viable consensus as discussed in relation to the Human Values Project (1995). Building on the initiative of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of special interest is the effort by religions to elaborate a global ethic and seek adherence to it.

    The very limited uptake in practice highlights the essentially delusional nature of the consensus sought with respect to "values" -- whose importance is so frequently cited as fundamental to global civilization.

  • Internet: The increasing role of the internet has been widely remarked. Euphoric enthusiasts have seen it as indicative of the emergence of "planetary consciousness" and a "global brain". The conventional view recently articulated has been that the internet and related technologies bring about social or political change, as claimed in relation to the Arab uprising of 2010-2011.

    The "device" of borrowing the approach to "delusion" from Dawkins has however been used to focus the counterargument of Evgeny Morozov (The Net Delusion: the dark side of internet freedom, 2011). Contrary to the "cyberutopians," as he calls them, Morozov convincingly argues that, in freedom's name, the internet more often than not constricts or even abolishes freedom -- notably through its use for purposes of surveillance (cf From ECHELON to NOLEHCE: enabling a strategic conversion to a faith-based global brain, 2007).

    Concerns are now widely raised regarding the surreptitious use to which mega-corporations have been discovered to be putting the personal data they collect online or failing to protect it (Apple is Tracking iPhone, iPad Users' Location, Daily Tech, 20 April 2011; Seth Finkelstein, Google's surveillance is taking us further down the road to hell, The Guardian, 26 March 2009; Peter Walker, Facebook loses friends as privacy campaign grows, The Guardian, 14 May 2010; en Quinn and Charles Arthur, PlayStation Network hackers access data of 77 million users, The Guardian, 26 April 2011). Other questionable practices are appropriately suspected -- despite increasingly predictable denials.

    Whilst the technology clearly enables higher degrees of interrelationship, it has yet to demonstrate any capacity to reframe the delusional nature of the disparate forms of "consensus" which multiple (and mutually antagonistic) groups construct within that context (Simulating a Global Brain: using networks of international organizations, world problems, strategies, and values, 2001; Dynamically Gated Conceptual Communities, 2004). What is the "global" nature of the conversations which the internet could potentially engender (Future Generation through Global Conversation, 1997)?

    Any "consensus" is however most powerfully undermined by the volume of accessible information, experienced as overload even within the more specialized domains -- especially given constraints on attention span and comprehension capacity.

  • Community life: Local communities, whether intentional or otherwise, have been upheld as offering the essence of consensual living. The approach has long been explored by intentional communities sharing a spiritual commitment (monasteries, ashrams, and the like). It has been followed by the commune movement in all its flavours, as identified by the Fellowship for Intentional Community.

    Their disparate nature, and their reactions to "outsiders", may be understood as making the point that consensus of a kind may be achieved locally but that the quest for any more global forms is a delusion. Reports of the dynamics within individual communities of this kind are also indicative of the extent to which consensus of a certain kind is imposed (if not "manufactured) and is effectively, if not necessarily, an obligation of membership.

  • Relationships: The delusional nature of consensus is perhaps most usefully highlighted in interpersonal relationships -- through the consensual union between two individuals -- even "until death do us part". The delusional nature of that "consensus", into which many enter so enthusiastically, is indicated by the statistical trend towards ever shorter periods of commitment -- and the pattern of infidelity, marriage breakdown, and domestic violence.

    It remains questionable whether a succession of relationships is indicative of a learning process leading to consensual relationships of greater maturity -- or whether aspirations to maturity of consensus are abandoned through compromises recognizing their delusional nature. Possibly a form of relationship RealPolitik.

    It is perhaps ironic that the literature on "consensual" relationships is increasingly focused on consensual sexual relationship -- in contrast to nonconsensual forms now increasingly associated with rape. Of particular relevance is the association of consensual sexual relationships with the experience of their consummation -- upheld as the epitome of consensus in one of its most fundamental experiential senses. Here too, however, concerns are widely raised regarding the suboptimum degree to which that experience fails to meet the promoted expectations of "consensual union".

  • Psychedelic enhancement and trance dancing: Jason Keehn (Trance Dancing - The Rave) raises the question whether trance-dancing can "save the planet":
    Thousands of bored youth pumping themselves up with drugs, going out to huge underground parties and dancing maniacally to electronic rhythms and psychedelic light-shows till dawn.... Why is it that at the peak moments (admittedly rare) of the very best underground house/techno/rave parties, we get this miraculous sense of hope, of possibility, of transformation . . . a feeling that we're actually heading somewhere. . . together. . . towards a brighter future, one worth living in, one where we've returned to some kind of harmony with ourselves, with each other and with our planet as a whole? Is it "just the drugs," a kind of consensus delusion, or might there be some basis in reality for these feelings, hard to justify as they may seem once we're back out in the normal world?

    Keehn cites Gurdjieff to the effect that:

    ... our ideas of free-will and individuality are a delusion, an image of our potential mistaken for a general fact of our existence. Bluntly put, we are blind products of genetics, conditioning and external influence; on an energetic level, we are next to nothing. We are less, in that sense, than most mammals even.

  • Crowd consensus: A sense of consensus is variously implicit in the above points. Of particular interest are cases where "consensus delusion" is named in response to acclaimed consensus. One study, described by Tom Jacobs (Racists Believe They Are Well Within the Norm, 28 April 2010) shows that new research finds racists mistakenly tend to believe they're less prejudiced than their neighbours. This was named as Racism - The Consensus Delusion (Global Sociology Blog, 28 April 2010).

    As a variant of the previous point, a striking process offering a high degree of collective consensus is increasingly enabled by the amplification of the coherence facilitated by scapegoating -- namely the capacity of the media to amplify and focus antipathy on a single individual as a form of "feeding frenzy". As "manufactured consent" by the media, the individual then constitutes a powerful "vehicle" for "consensus" -- on what the collective is not.

    Examples have been provided in the current period by Osama bin Laden and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, as discussed separately (Iconic Extrajudicial Execution of Jesus through Osama by US? 2011; Pre-Judging an Institution's Implicit Strategy by the Director's Private Behaviour, 2011). Both provide a form of social consensus, but unfortunately of limited duration -- requiring that further scapegoats be identified for "sacrifice" according to the traditional, primitive pattern. Is a form of consensus engendered by "feeding" on enemies brought to "justice"? Is it increasingly the case that reason is irrelevant to consensus? Is it emotional catharsis that is more vital?

  • Psychosocial construction of "reality": Consensual reality can be claimed to be a psychosocial construction. Various schools of thought articulate the claim that the only reality we can know is that which is represented by human thought, namely that meaning or knowledge is always a human construction. The issue highlighted above remains in that any consensus on that construction is variously partial -- with the paradoxical possibility of having been constructed to be so.

    The potentially pathological considerations -- the delusional nature of a constructed consensus -- are variously noted is writings on schizophrenia, as by Rollie Bollocks (Schizophrenics, Base Nothing, 17 December 2010).
    ... the consensus delusion of what constitutes reality is forged in a scientific looking glass of psychiatric reductionism. More often than not, the theoretical underpinnings of psychiatry are based on studies of the brain, and this too is a reductive dismissal that the entire body is responsible for the internal states of the individual, and while inquiries into the brain may often lead to useful discoveries, patients are not walking brains, anymore than they are chemical imbalances.
    In a study by Al Sieber ( A Schizophrenia Breakthrough: progressing toward freeing our minds from our minds, 2007), the understanding of "mental illness" as "A Delusional Consensus Reality" is challenged (in an appendix).

    Within this context it might be provocatively asked whether the individuation process, upheld as the royal road to emergent maturity, involves navigating degrees of delusion -- possibly to be understood as a "dance" with delusion.

In each case there is little sense of how to progress beyond naive and simplistic understandings of consensus. Each case exemplifies entrapment in delusional approaches to consensus -- which the future may have every right to label pathological.


[Parts: First | Prev | Next | Last | All] [Links: To-K | From-K | From-Kx | Refs ]