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Misrepresentation of the 2052 Report?


Engendering 2052 through Re-imagining the Present: Review of a report to the Club of Rome (Part #8)


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The above representation of the report itself is potentially to be considered unfair in the light of more detailed examination of its contents. The detail is however necessarily lost in a 12-minute presentation (as noted by its author at the time) or in a 1-page press release. But it is through these modes that the book was launched, in careful anticipation of its delayed publication (a month later). It could be argued that it is through the "technical" information deliberately concentrated into such devices that interpretation of its wider significance was desired. In a sense the modality is that characteristic of the conventions of the past. In comparison, relatively few will choose to read the report in detail

The 2052 Report, and that of the Royal Society, will be criticized for their failure to take account of parameters regarding quality of life, including exposure to violence and criminality (especially given the expected increase in social unrest), now carefully incorporated into the UNDP Human Development Index in relation to some of the concerns highlighted above. Given the role of confidence, it is curious that so little attention is paid to the Consumer Confidence Index or the various measures of business confidence.

More fundamental to any expectation of attention to the report's insights are measures of delivery capacity of the remedial initiatives of institutions of global agencies and governments -- notably exacerbated by instances of erosion of the chain of command and the emergence of "rogue elements". Despite highlighting greater social unrest, the report fails to consider the degree to which social bonds of trust may break down, threatening the very fabric of society -- especially to the extent that the delinking is reflected in communication between generations and an ever increasing disregard for the "other".

In an effort to take account of surprises, the 2052 Report offers a set of "Wild Cards": Abundant Oil or Gas, Financial Meltdown, Nuclear War, Disease, Collapse of Ecological Systems, Counterrevolution in China, Revolution in the United States, and a Dedicated Global Effort to Stop Climate Change. Having been widely discussed, it is questionable whether these have the disruptive dimensions of unforeseen surprises.

Irrelevance: Of particular concern is an implication of comprehensiveness, with only passing reference to what has been excluded in its systemic approach. The 2052 Report notes:

These system dynamics models embody a lot of academic theory -- drawn from economics, political science, sociology, engineering, biology, agriculture, and environmental science. But as with any set of projection tools, they still provide only mild assurance that my forecast makes dynamic sense. Taken together, this diversity of sources and tools provides one perspective on the world socioeconomic-cultural-natural system. My forecast of the global future to 2052 is a reflection of this perspective. It is not the "complete truth". It describes some aspects of real-world developments, and neglects many others. This is unavoidable, but also desirable in order to avoid drowning in irrelevant detail. (pp. 53-54)

The issue here is "irrelevant" to whom? This has been the preoccupation of the Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential in seeking out the perceptions of thousands of disparate international constituencies, many of which would find it difficult to identify with the concerns which are the focus of the report.

If the uncited insights of the other reports to the Club of Rome are to be considered irrelevant, do those in policy-making positions run the risk of "drowning in irrelevant detail" by considering them?

Assertions of "irrelevance" and the threat of "drowning" are even more strange now that massive simulations are being organized in the light of the data emerging from the electronic communications of social networking (FuturICT Living Earth Platform; Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulations, Sentient World Simulation; Jostein Ryssevik, The Social Science Dream Machine: resource discovery, analysis, and delivery on the web, Social Science Computer Review, Summer 2001). At the time of writing, an application with proven capacity in the management of such detail, namely Facebook (originating in 2004, now with 900 million active users), has been put on the market for a record figure of $100 billion.

It could be argued that earlier failures to attend vigorously to detail have been factors in enabling the subprime mortgage crisis. Can the eurozone crisis be considered a surprise when already in 2006 it was reported that for 12 years the European Union's auditors have refused to endorse the spending of large parts of the EU budget (Stephen Mulvey, Why the EU's audit is bad news, BBC News, 24 October 2006). If it is claimed that "the devil is in the detail", the 2052 Report can be seen as avoiding the need for any such preoccupation. This is also indicative of dependence on earlier and simpler simplistic dynamical "models" without any consideration of the insights from the subsequent emergence of chaos theory.

Arbitrary choice of paradigm? Perhaps more problematic is the very nature of such model building. The 2052 Report explicitly notes:

A paradigm is a worldview. There are many different worldviews. Marxism is one, religious conservatism another. None is right. Different paradigms simply highlight different aspects of reality. A paradigm is also a simplification that helps you distinguish the noise from significant trends (as defined by your own paradigm, that is). But it is most important to understand that your chosen paradigm -- which is normally tacit, rarely described -- has surprisingly strong impact on what you see.... When trying to clarify the next forty years, it is important to include the possibility of a change in the dominant paradigm. At least one should avoid limiting oneself to analyses through one set of glasses, namely, the current dominant paradigm. (p. 9)

Again it should be stressed that the dynamics inhibiting any form of consensual policy-making derive specifically from congruencies adopting alternative paradigms. In contrast to the methodology of the Encyclopedia (see Assessment: Global modelling perspective), this degree of complexity is ignored -- presumably in the hope that a single paradigm will dominate to make matters simpler to understand.

Questionable questions? The report is equally explicit in assuming that only a limited set of pre-determined questions need be considered:

You cannot create a useful model unless you decide ahead of time what specific question you want to answer -- what social phenomenon you want to elucidate. As skilled model builders know well, unless you focus, you quickly get lost in an ocean of detail. I chose to let my forecasting effort be guided by two questions: What will happen to consumption over the next forty years? and Under what conditions -- in what social and natural environment -- will that future consumption take place? (p. 54)

Primacy of intangible challenges: Curiously the report variously acknowledges that the core challenges are psychosocial rather than tangible:

  • Thus the main challenge in our global future is not to solve the problems we are facing, but to reach agreement to do so. (p. 225)
  • The core problem lies in the systems and policies that allow or drive expansion beyond what is sustainable -- in growth beyond carrying capacity. (p. 308)
  • Having been in your situation for some time, I do agree that the main challenge is mental. (p. 351)
  • I am talking about a great shift of paradigm... In today's globalized society, without a globalized power structure, no one is in a position to stop such a shift. (p. 314)
  • ...human culture will continue to evolve ... humanity in the future will organize itself in a very different manner and rely on unconventional inputs in decision making. (p. 313)
  • ... the evolution of human values -- is currently perhaps the least visible. It concerns the answer to the question What really matters? (p. 190)

Inaction vs. the "kick": Recognizing these intangibles, the report also notes:

  • Today we know what was done during the first forty years -- and what was not done. We know a great deal about the rationale for the decisions made during these decades. And we have a fair understanding of the pressures that have locked us into nonaction on a number of fronts. (p. 6)
  • The complex and time-consuming decision making of democratic nation-states will ensure that. (p. 6)
  • But my story also includes the societal response that will emerge in an attempt to solve the emerging problems of depletion, pollution, and inequity through increased investments (in both prevention and adaptation). (p. 55)

Despite such knowledge, and the final claim, no effort is made to integrate these factors into a systemic account.


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