[Parts: First | Prev | Next | Last | All] [Links: To-K | From-K | From-Kx | Refs ]
Curiously, and notably in relation to the special theory of relativity, physicists only design themselves into its framework as virtual observers -- if at all. They only engage psychologically with such frames of reference through their acquisition and ownership of associated cognitive property. In effect they deal in "bloodless categories" despite the "bloody" uses to which a theory may be put by those who acquire the relevant know how (or "art", in patenting terms).
The strategic importance of "giving ownership" is recognized in political programmes, in business, as well as in ensuring "buy-in" in support of community development. The psycho-political concept of "buy-in" may be considered in relation to a developmental vision -- effectively a framework within the spectrum noted above (cf Mark S. Walton, Generating Buy-In: mastering the language of leadership, 2003). This raises questions about how one makes a framework "one's own".
Interesting examples of this at the collective level are provided by the process of land nám, coined by Ananda Coomaraswamy (The Rg Veda as Land-Nama Book, 1935), to refer to the Icelandic tradition of claiming ownership of uninhabited spaces through weaving together a metaphor of geography of place into a unique mythic story. This territorial appropriation process, notably practiced by the Navaho and the Vedic Aryans, was further described by Joseph Campbell (The Inner Reaches of Outer Space: metaphor as myth and religion, 1986):
Land nám ("land claiming or taking") was [the Norse] technical term for this way of sanctifying a region, converting it thereby into an at once psychologically and metaphysical Holy Land.... Land nám, mythologization, has been the universally practiced method to bring this intelligible kingdom to view in the mind's eye. The Promised Land, therefore, is any landscape recognized as mythologically transparent, and the method of acquisition of such territory is not by prosaic physical action, but poetically, by intelligence and the method of art; so that the human being should be dwelling in the two worlds simultaneously of the illuminated moon and the illuminating sun. (p. 34)
The process continues to be common whenever dominated territories recover their independence -- as in South Africa where indigenous geographical names are substituted for European names. Variants are to be found in the naming of theories, equations and processes by scientists -- after their originators in the discipline in question. In the case of astronomers and biologists, this extends to stars and species respectively. This offers a more dilute understanding of cognitive property -- unrecognized by law as intellectual property -- by which communities empowered to do so place their (trade)mark upon cognitive space.
The cognitive psychology associated with the quest by physicists for a Theory of Everything may be usefully seen in this light. It may be understood as a means of gaining "possession" of, and "owning", the world -- especially for the individual who can formulate it. The cognitive status of such a meta-frame has qualities that strongly resemble those of the mystical quest for union with a supreme deity -- and the cognitive property that religions respectively claim with regard to their originating creator. This raises the interesting question of the cognitive status of a Theory of Everything, explicable and comprehensible only to the very few, in comparison with a deity inexplicable and incomprehensible to others (cf Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, 2006).
Of potentially related interest to any generic understanding of frameworks is a classic Buddhist text entitled the Brahmajala Sutta (The Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views). This appears to be unique in endeavouring to map out as a system the complete set of fundamental viewpoints. It is the first sutta in the entire collection of the Buddha's discourses in the Pali Tripitaka. Its importance stems from its primary objective, namely the exposition of a scheme of 62 cases designed to include all possible views (past and future) on the central concern of speculative thought, the nature of the self in relation to the world (see review).
At a more mundane level, fruitful questions may be asked about the frameworks through which an individual engages coherently with the world as a whole (cf Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: a necessary unity, 1980; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy In The Flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to western thought, 1999; My Reflecting Mirror World, 2002; Being the Universe: a metaphoric frontier, 1999). The dynamic process of progressively patenting intellectual property then bears a curious resemblance to the Buddhist cognitive understanding of "laying down a path" as promoted by Francisco Varela (Laying Down a Path in Walking. In: W I Thompson (Ed). Gaia: A Way of Knowing, 1987).
How indeed does potential cognitive property get "discovered" and "invented"? Generically, how do its boundaries get determined -- notably as a container or vehicle for possession and ownership? To what authority are claims addressed?
In an era in which democratic principles are considered vital to social organization, and in which inventions are made by individuals, what is to be learnt about voters from the manner in which patent rights are "assigned" to collective entities? How does this apply to the relationship of individuals to belief systems, including ideologies and religions?
[Parts: First | Prev | Next | Last | All] [Links: To-K | From-K | From-Kx | Refs ]