</a>Systemic response to systemic imbalance from negligence

Spontaneous Initiation of Armageddon -- a heartfelt response to systemic negligence (Part #8)

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The negligence noted above might be presented summarily in the following terms (see also introduction to the Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential) :

• Broken commitments: Breakdown of trust and consequently of confidence-based systems, despite ever more intense use of news management to justify such confidence:
  • much more acute recognition of the suspect nature of promises by leadership.
  • sharper recognition of the lack of commitment in the promises made by modern leadership in striking contrast with the binding contracts through which people are called upon to express their commitment -- and to whose penalty clauses they are held by law.
  • increasing awareness of relative impunity of leadership, even following the most flagrant abuses
    
    
• Failure of enlightened models of leadership: The inadequacy of the variety of exemplars of leadership might be summarized as follows:
• individual heroes: It is clear that the classical hero no longer has anything to offer in the leadership of modern societies, despite efforts to benefit from the hero-image in American presidential politics [more]. See also Orrin Klapp (Heroes, Villains, and Fools: The Changing American Character, 1962). The Right Livelihood Foundation has explored the possibility of promoting heroic leadership of local initiatives but with little possibility of extending this to larger collectives. There are no Nelson Mandelas relevant to the global challenge, although children do indeed distinguish the merits of those like Martin Luther King. Indeed those (self)promoted as relevant are increasingly characterized as tainted. The heroic function is however now variously recognized in the form of prize winners (Nobel, etc), sport and media stars, and whistleblowers. The status of suicide bombers is a case in point -- given the absence of any constructive equivalent.
• heroic groups of the wise and powerful: The classical model of the mythical Arthurian roundtable has been followed in various ways by a variety of analogues: mythical groups (Sarmoung), Templars, secret societies (including freemasons and esoteric groups), enlightened NGOs (Associaion for a New Humanity), NGOs of the powerful (Club of Rome, Trilateral Commission, etc), councils of the wise, wisdom keepers. The esoteric groups underlying the Nazi imitative should not be forgotten.
• networks of excellence, as promoted by the European Commission to interlink those with key technical expertise -- but which have not been successfully extended to those of governance
• organizational boards, as the modern roundtable par excellence, which have been significantly challenged to look responsibly beyond their often self-interested) mandates -- or, in the case of the use of such roundtables at meetings, to transcend meaningfully and integrate the vital differences of the participants
• media representation of individual leadership: The desire for real heroes has been transformed by the media into packaging of surrogate heroes (007, Clint Eastwood, etc), whether as media stars, in storylines, or in virtual entities (avatars). Such heroes are portrayed as playing key roles in containing the "bad guys" and safeguarding society. . It is unfortunate that the plots have had to be developed in ways that illustrate the ambiguity of the hero role without indicating how it might be more fruitfully taken up as an exemplar in response to social conditions.
• media representation of collective leadership: The desire for real groups acting with integrity has been transformed by the media into packaging of surrogate heroic groups, such as special force and secret intelligence teams.


• Promotion of closed system pseudo achievements: At a time when many challenges facing individuals and human society are associated with the complexities of broad, open systems, it is striking to observe the extent to which widely publicized innovative "achievements" and "breakthroughs" are in almost all cases associated with narrow, closed systems ("neater" problems). It might readily be assumed that such closed system challenges (of tractable problems) are selected because of the probability of success -- implicitly recognizing the difficulty of responding effectively to the real challenges of society and the environment. For example:
  • expertise: the solutions achieved typically call upon a narrow range of (usually technical) expertise to the exclusion of challenges that can only be met with a wider range of expertise (including biological and psycho-social skills). Such solutions respond successfully to challenges of predictable dynamics, avoiding those characterized by unpredictable dynamics (intractable problems). The approach might be caricatured as "fiddling while Rome burns" in response to the "winds of change" (even if the "fiddling" is characterized by extremes of technical genius in instrument design, composition and performance).
  • profiteering: typically only those solutions are sought and developed which contribute significantly to the profit margin needs of a narrow range of corporations (and, through taxation, to governments) -- pleased to be able to develop and patent saleable hi-tech products and to prevent the development of any lower cost alternatives based on intermediate technology.. Although technically feasible, delivery of solutions (such as health) is then focused on the few who can sustain those profit margins and precludes their extension to the underprivileged (as illustrated by the delivery of pharmaceutical drugs in Africa). In Japan, for example, a high cost robotic washing machine has been developed to bathe the elderly, to avoid the socio-economic implications of importing nurses from countries such as Thailand and the Philippines.
  • resources: the status and resources attached to focussing on the "very big" (galaxies and the universe, global weather systems, or macro-economics), or "very small" (fundamental particles, molecules) -- or the "very distant" past (first seconds of the universe), or the "very brief" (elusive particles) -- far exceeds that attached to systems of human dimensionality (relationships, quality of life, food supply) that are fundamental to daily experience. The "cutting edge" of the advancement of knowledge has been dissociated from human scale preoccupations.
  • hyping achievements: the landings on the Moon or Mars, hyped as a "major achievement" offers a range of specific technical challenges in what might almost be defined as an ideal, highly controlled laboratory environment attractive to the "hard sciences" and to the high tech corporations in the "military-industrial complex". Typically the investment in funds and expertise is totally out of proportion to that accorded to more pressing issues on the ground for which a wider range of expertise is required. The hyped "value to humanity" of "exploring the final frontier" is used to obscure military and financial agends, with the complicity of relevant disciplines.
  • action substitutes: the focus on repeated monitoring of complex (weather patterns, etc) and problematic (endangered species, etc) conditions as a feasible technical activity (suggesting that "action is being taken" with regard to the problem) that requires no attention to the challenges of developing and implementing effective responses within an open socio-political system with many conflicting priorities. The focus is on discovering what action should be taken and not on how to undertake that action, and the need to respect or remove the constraints on that action. This form of research is fundamentally irresponsible especially when used to disguise other agendas (as with "scientific whaling")..
  • misframing: the metaphorical framing of the response to some major social problem (drugs, terrorism, etc) on which action is taken as a "war". This points to the intellectual, attitudinal, and organizational skills (borrowed from the polarized technicalities of conventional warfare) that are deemed appropriate to any action, notably avoiding psycho-social systemic issues of why people are driven to consume drugs or engage in suicidal terrorism. (see Enhancing Sustainable Development Strategies through Avoidance of Military Metaphors, 1998)
  • false claims: the justification of claims on scarce resources for product development in terms of "vital" security or health criteria, or "the advancement of knowledge", that preclude any evaluation of such claims against the wider needs of greater numbers -- and typically in situations where the results of such development will only benefit the few (for reasons of cost, claimed to be beyond the social responsibility of those engaged in such development)
  Each of these is in many ways a distraction from the inability to handle the challenges faced by the many.

• Failure of "Standard Development Model": As noted by many critics, the development model favoured and imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (for example) has proven to be highly problematic and has effectively failed to respond to the rising tide of deprivation. Whilst such development has magnificently rewarded the consultants and politicians involved in its implementation, the longer term consequences have been ignored or systematically denied. Any "new and better model", presented to remedy acknowledged defects, is only acceptable to the extent that it fails to address more fundamental issues. The possibility of viable alternative approaches, adapted to local conditions, has been precluded. Those seeking to adopt them, if only experimentally, tend to be subject to (possibly severe) pressures of one form or another. Their achievements go unpublicized and their failures are exaggerated. As experiments, the possibility of their improvement goes unexplored.
  
  
• Failure of delivery systems. The many ambitious programmes to deliver food, water, health, essential services, pensions, etc to populations are severely challenged in industrialized countries and are essentially a failure in developing countries. This has been especially evident in the case of privatization -- as for example in the case of railway transportation and health services in the UK. It is increasingly evident worldwide in the highly problematic situation with regard to pensions (and the contract with those obliged to subscribe to them over long decades).
  
  
• Failure of interpretative ability: : It is increasingly clear that the capacity to interpret meaningfully the avaible information (on disasters facing social systems and the planet) are inadequate to the challenge -- as dramatically illustrated by the problematic capacity of the intelligence services, aided and abetted by their political masters, to interpret information relating to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Ironically the lessons learnt from Iraq are the need for ever more invasive surveillance information without any increase in interpretative ability beyond that relating to immediate security preoccupations. There is no record of intelligence services offering insights into solutions to the non-security challenges of society.
  
  
• Failure to act effectively: As partly illustrated by the case of delivery systems, and the token responses to many problematic situations, the failure of interpretative ability exacerbates the inherent challenges of effective action. The relationship between the conclusions of such interpretation and effective political action remains highly problematic as evident from the inability of bodies such as the United Nations to act effectively in response to reported problems (eg widespread starvation in Ethiopia). What effective action will be taken in response to the suppressed Pentagon report on climate change? More often than not, "resolutions" are at best indicative of wishful thinking. The ineffectiveness is compounded by the tendency to focus on remedying the problems of others, such as through effective "regime change" dependent on new weaponry, whilst being unable to address one's own systemic problems and dysfunctional behaviour.
  
  
• "Tinkering" approaches to institutional and strategic reform: As typified by the decades of exploration into the reform of the United Nations, efforts at institutional reform, if they take place, may be validly described as "tinkering". They essentially fail to address fundamental issues, are primarily respectful of vested interests, and fail to take account of the significant organizational implications of new and emerging communication technologies. The challenges to the reform of the European Commission provide a second striking example.
  
  
• Denial of systemic nature of institutional corruption: Although corruption of various forms is now widely recognized (after long denial) within institutions and their leadership, the focus is on the specific individuals involved. Prime examples include the European Statistical Office (Eurostat) and the leadership of some western political parties (increasingly to be caricatured as "tainted merchandise"). Such exceptionalism precludes the exploration of systemic corruption and the creation of an atmosphere of corruption within institutions. In the case of Eurostat, for example, no questions are raised about the distortion of statistical data in response to the pressures of corruption.
  
  
• Tolerance of "basket case" conditions: There is an increasing acceptance that nothing effective can be done about certain social situations, whether groups within a country (such as indigenous peoples, or HIV cases) or whole countries (eg Bangladesh)
  
  
• Failure of dialogue: Despite repeated calls for "dialogue" (even at the highest level) and repeated claims that effective dialogue is underway, it is clear that such "dialogue" is interpreted as narrowly as possible in order to justify claims of efficacy. It is however essentially and fundamentally tokenistic -- in order to be able to claim that dialogue and "consultation" has taken place. It is designed to preclude effective discourse amongst those of dissident views -- into which very little research is undertaken. Terrorism might be usefully labelled as a direct consequence of the failure of dialogue -- exacerbated by a failure of dialogue amongst religions viewing each other as "satanic". Such failure contributes directly to the perceptions of the "unreasonableness" of terrorists and the failure to acknowledge the realities out of which they act.
  
• Secrecy, lying, cover-up, misrepresentation and denial: As discussed separately, these severely inhibit any capacity for wholehearted remedial action (see Global Strategic Implications of the "Unsaid": from myth-making towards a "wisdom society", 2003; Politicization of Evidence in the Plastic Turkey Era: al-Qaida, Saddam, Assassination and the Hijab, 2003; Complementary Truth-handling Strategies: Mediating the relationship between the "Last class" and the "Liar class"). Especially from the highest levels, it has now become difficult to make credible statements about any credible threat or viable mode of action.

A common thread in many of the above is the narrow, asystemic selection of the systems to which attention is accorded -- precluding any consideration to wider systems of which they are part.

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