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Vision metaphor


Cyclopean Vision vs Poly-sensual Engagement (Part #2)


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A basic criticism of the framing and labelling of the phenomenon in question as a "spectacle" is that this effectively traps discussion of it in a particular metaphor, based on just one of the senses, namely vision -- irrespective of references to "multi-media". This is totally consistent with the almost universal tendency to frame the planning and policy issues of governance, at all levels of society, in terms of vision -- to the exclusion of any other metaphorical framework (cf Developing a Metaphorical Language for the Future, 1994).

The approach is reflected in presentations of institutional plans through promotional visualizations, whether technical or glossy. This tendency is echoed in the approach recommended to individuals in "envisaging" their own future -- and possibly adopted by them in "vision quests" and "vision workshops". Decision-making, especially in the business world, is often preceded by "putting on a show". Guy Debord does not seem to have recognized the role of spectacle as metaphor. Kellner makes no reference to the now widely recognized framing role of metaphor, notably illustrated by the concern with the spectacular of George Lakoff (Women, Fire and Dangerous Things; what categories reveal about the human mind, 1987 ).

By this metaphor the image of the future is effectively envisaged through a lens -- an optical metaphor suggesting the possibility of "focus". The term "spectacle" is itself strongly associated with the corrective lenses provided by opticians. Curiously however the metaphor is not extended, either in the governance (or personal) case, to cover the possibility that any vision may require a corrective lens to be meaningfully "seen" -- or whether any "spectacle" is effectively a lens, however inappropriate to those called upon to use it. In which case the spectacle would indeed introduce any of a range of distortions of vision -- well-known in the physical case -- whose metaphorical equivalents are never examined. Futurists in policy think tanks -- many of whom wear spectacles -- are not required to have their metaphorical "eyes" tested. Indeed there are no standard tests analogous to those used by opticians.

Should a spectacle then be understood as a lens, effectively prepared by those able to do so, which connects the factual dots such as to introduce a particular focusing curvature into perceptions of reality? This then brings some things into special focus such as to minimize others? In an alternative metaphor a spectacle might be understood as a kind of directional antenna capable of resolving distant phenomena in a particular way. However both metaphors point to the value of appropriately separated spectacles in order to obtain a sense of perspective (cf John A T Robinson, Truth is Two-eyed, 1979). This binocular approach has been extended to a poly-ocular approach by Magoroh Maruyama (Polyocular Vision or Subunderstanding? Organization Studies, 25, 2004, pp 467-480) and notably considered as relevant to agriculture, as admirably described by Egon Noe, et al (A semiotic polyocular framework for multidisciplinary research in relation to multifunctional farming and rural development, 2005). In poly-ocular vision, the differences between several images enable detection of invisible dimensions, which cannot be obtained by adding several images (Maruyama, 1978).

This "perspective" contrasts with the cyclopean monocular vision of a single spectacle -- often designed to supercede all others and to deny any complementary insights they may offer. It goes beyond Kellner's "multiperspectivist" approach.

This argument could be considered a trivial device were it not for the obvious need for more than one sense in order to navigate the environment without disaster -- and the dangers of seeking to rely on a uni-sensual interface with the environment. In the case of uncorrected vision, the problems of short-sightedness and long-sightedness are well known -- as with blindness. The metaphorical implications of colour-blindness, night-blindness and astigmatism far less so. More serious however is the constraint imposed by line of sight -- and the extreme dependence on sound, smell and touch then required to detect unseen dangers and opportunities.

In the case presented by Kellner, a spectacle does indeed impose a "totalizing vision" -- as with certain kinds of "fish-eye" distorting lens. The optical metaphor therefore opens the possibility of other forms of criticism. But more interesting is the possibility that such a dominant governance metaphor may obscure the fact that the vision presented "stinks" -- a possibility only detectable with a sense excluded metaphorically from the spectacle.

Within the context of the spectacle, what active senses enable detection of phenomena out of the line of sight? Although much is made of the multi-media dimensions of a spectacle, it is noteworthy that any such are designed primarily to reinforce the visual framing -- particularly in the case of governance programme proposals. Although the vision may be strongly reinforced by sound (cf NSF/ICAD Sonification Report), it is technically more problematic to extend that to feel, smell and taste. Little is said about the possibility that beautiful visions may suffer irredeemably from the metaphorical equivalent of bad taste -- project "body odour" and "halitosis"!?

Reliance on vision reinforces unhealthy tendencies to disengagement and viewing from a distance -- echoed in "hands-off" styles of governance reliant on the visual metaphor. The point is well-made by the title of the study by Sherry Turkle (Life on the Screen: identity in the age of the internet, 1995). This disengagement is also echoed in tendencies to voyeurism and various forms of eroticism -- typically characteristic of spectacles as documented by Kellner -- and paralleled by the many current forms of invasive surveillance.

The suppression through spectacles of modes of knowing other than vision tends then to evoke them surreptiously -- in ways unintegrated into the cognitive processes of governance and public debate. This is evident in the role of music. Above all it is evident in the degrees of cognitive engagement offered in compensation through alcohol and drugs -- in ways impossible for spectacles (although Kellner notes Debord's description of them as part of a "permanent opium war").


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