From Changing the Strategic Game to Changing the Strategic Frame (Part #4)
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The relationship between such a set of questions, and their implications for any collective action, can be seen as central to governance as explored elsewhere (Responsibility for Global Governance Who? Where? When? How? Why? Which? What? 2008). The exploration follows the insights of the widely circulated classic "poem", which exists in various versions:
This is a story about four people: Everybody, Somebody, Anybody and Nobody.
There was an important job to be done and Everybody was asked to do it.
Everybody was sure that Somebody would do it.
Anybody could have done it, but Nobody did.
Somebody got angry because it was Everybody's job.
Everybody knew that Anybody could do it,
but Nobody realised that Somebody wouldn't do it.
And Everybody blamed Somebody because
Nobody did what Anybody could have done.
Such considerations, whether interpreted as "cynical" or otherwise, will not prevent some actions from being enthusiastically and successfully undertaken -- and being widely presented as the key to the future. However there is a case for considering the adage used by Abraham Lincoln:
You can fool some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the time but you can't fool all of the people all of the time
Perhaps adapting it as:
Some of the people will succeed all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but all of the people will not succeed all of the time
Use of "succeed" here implies a common understanding of "success" when this is quite evidently not the case. Adapting another adage, it might even be said that "one person's success is another person's failure" -- despite belief in the possibility of "win-win" solutions to the global challenge (Hazel Henderson, Building a Win-Win World: Life Beyond Global Economic Warfare, 1995). Does this quest correspond, if only thermodynamically, to that for a perpetual motion machine?
This challenge is compounded by a dimension that is not amenable to formal discussion, namely the distaste that a modality favoured by one may have for another. Rather than referring to differences of strategic "vision", as the favoured metaphor, it is useful to make the point more strongly and personally by switching to a "smell" metaphor. Put simply, for some the approaches of another "stink" -- however much the odour is appreciated by those from whom it emanates !
The failure of cooperation and collective uptake of strategies can then be explored through that metaphor (Epistemological Challenge of Cognitive Body Odour: exploring the underside of dialogue, 2006). Enlarging the metaphorical framework allows recognition that other "senses" may be vital to strategic navigation of the future, as they are for navigation of nature and, by extension, the planet (Strategic Challenge of Polysensorial Knowledge: bringing the "elephant" into "focus", 2008). After decades of effort, there is a case for exploring more deeply the failure to learn from calls for global action (Collective Learning from Calls for Global Action, 1981).
Any effort to change the "system" then calls for recognition of the radical nature of the encounter with the varieties of "otherness" of which the "system" is composed (Us and Them: Relating to Challenging Others, 2009; Existential challenge of "The Other", 2007; Human Intercourse: Intercourse with Nature and Intercourse with the Other, 2007). This is only too evident in the mutual incomprehension fundamental to the decade-long, trillion dollar strategic failure in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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