Common pattern of strategic responses?

Strategic Implications of 12 Unasked Questions in Response to Disaster (Part #4)

The pattern of response is reminiscent of a lynch mob mentality, now exacerbated by a modern media frenzy -- as indicated by the extent of coverage of the Boston marathon bombings. This of course contrasts remarkably with the minimalistic coverage of the many "incidents" involving far greater number of deaths in Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan -- in which families are notably disrupted by the death of innocent children and bystanders.

Following the controversies over "enhanced interrogation" (aka torture), extraordinary rendition, and imprisonment without trial for extended periods, the interaction between the erosion of collective morality and the erosion of legality is increasingly evident, as highlighted with respect to increasing use of drones by Maureen Dowd (The C.I.A.'s Angry Birds, The New York Times, 16 April 2013).

It would seem that the assertive declaration (now frequently made by authorities in response to disaster) that "all the options are on the table" somehow only includes those that reflect the pattern of questions asked, excluding those neglected by failure to ask more radically appropriate questions (Framing the Global Future by Ignoring Alternatives: unfreezing categories as a vital necessity, 2009; Considering All the Strategic Options -- whilst ignoring alternatives and disclaiming cognitive protectionism, 2009). How to prove that no options have been ignored when some argue specifically, citing opportunities ignored, that this is clearly not the case? How are "non-negotiable" options to be reconciled with such a declaration?

The rationalization of "printing money", under the euphemism of quantitative easing (to avert financial bankruptcy), can increasingly be seen as extended to a form of "qualitative easing" with respect to morality (From Quantitative Easing (QE) to Moral Easing (ME): a stimulus package to avert moral bankruptcy? 2010). Whether or not moral equivalence is claimed or denied (cf. Jeane Kirkpatrick, The Myth of Moral Equivalence, Imprimis, January 1986), the approach evokes the possibility of an unquestionable pattern of "be done by as you did" -- which lends itself to speculative reflection (Writing Guidelines for Future Occupation of Earth by Extraterrestrials: be done by as you did? 2010). Offering a degree of reality to that speculation is the announcement, at the time of writing, that NASA has discovered the most Earth-like planets yet -- orbiting distant stars.

Curiously the process of eliciting and pandering to a lynch mob mentality may be seen as consistent -- but perversely, to the longer-term disadvantage of society -- with that associated problematically with engendering popular consent (Edward Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion, 2011, Propaganda, 1928; Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent: the political economy of the mass media, 1988). How then to recognize the possibility of groupthink and its consequences for "intelligence failure" -- and to enable corrective measures? How then to address the systemic challenge of question avoidance (Question Avoidance, Evasion, Aversion and Phobia: why we are unable to escape from traps, 2006)?

More problematic is the degree to which it can be suspected that information released to the public during the course of any disaster is designed to ramp up knee-jerk responses and the justification for them. The pattern is in process of being documented in relation to the Boston Marathon bombings (Julie Lévesque, The Boston Bombing Web of Lies, Global Research, 26 April 2013; Alex Seitz-Wald, The "Facts" Keep Changing About the Boston Bombings -- and it's fueling a conspiracy theory industry, AlterNet, April 2013).

The difficulty is that a related pattern is evident in relation to increasing concerns regarding the continuing conflict in Syria and the possible use of "chemical weapons" (Stephen Lendman, Fabricated Intelligence and the WMD Pretext: Obama heads closer to war on Syria, Global Research, 25 April 2013; David Edwards, Won't Get Fooled Again? Hyping Syria's WMD 'Threat', Media Lens, 13 December 2012). The existence of such "evidence" has now been confirmed by David Cameron (Alan Cowell and Hwaida Saad, British Leader Says Evidence of Chemical Warfare in Syria Is Limited but Growing, The New York Times, 26 April 2013).

There is no capacity to question the credibility of such statements in the light of the widely noted falsity of the earlier declaration formally made by Colin Powell to the United Nations Security Council on 5 February 2003 in order to enable intervention in Iraq -- and the associated misrepresentation of "evidence" by the British Prime Minister at that time. There is no question of asking what might be the source of the chemical weapons or their precursors -- just as questions are avoided regarding the source of the arms used in Syria or in other arenas of bloody conflict. The logic recalls the primary argument presented in response to gun control campaigners by the US National Rifle Association: Guns don't kill people, people do. It is not clear why this argument does not also apply to "chemical weapons" or to the considerable concern with regard to acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran. There is accumulating evidence that white phosphorus has been variously employed over the past decade, notably by those concerned about its claimed use in Syria.

Why are authoritative statements about the accumulation of "evidence" now to be taken seriously in the light of the past pattern of misrepresentation? How is any authority with the power to misrepresent the facts now able to prove that the evidence is not tainted in some way and has not been subject to various forms of tampering? As with the request made of Iran, what form should "concrete proof" now take with respect to other matters of concern, as separately discussed (10 Demands for Concrete Proof by We the Peoples of the World, 2012). Is the visual evidence of the use of bombs to be taken as valid evidence -- given that "false flag" operations may well be justified to decision makers by reasons of "national security", as has happened in the past? The question now is not what is to be construed as "evidence", but rather how much would it cost to fake that "evidence" credibly, and to whom is the price worth paying? (Politicization of Evidence in the Plastic Turkey Era al-Qaida, Saddam, Assassination and the Hijab, 2003).

Modern advertising campaigns of any kind, especially with respect to competing products, increasingly make the issue comprehensible to many. The use of superlatives by each, to claim originality and superiority, can only imply that one or both are lying -- with little possibilty of being credibly challenged.

As suggested by Vali Nasr with respect to Afghanistan, there is a case for exploring the matter otherwise -- as is most notably evident in the work of Josh Kerbel for the US intelligence community as a consequence of 9/11. Nasr cites Richard Holbrooke with respect to strategic formulation by the latter's team on Afghanistan:

I want you to learn nothing from government...This place is dead intellectually. It does not produce any ideas; it is all about turf battles and checking the box. Your job is to break through all this.

As implied by Nasr, the past decade in the Afghanistan arena would seem to have demonstrated that strategy is elaborated and implemented by "know-it-alls" -- lacking any ability to question the basis for their own confidence (Transforming the Unsustainable Cost of General Education: strategic insights from Afghanistan, 2009). This despite the widely remarked admission regarding the existence of unknown unknowns by the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, as discussed separately (Unknown Undoing: challenge of incomprehensibility of systemic neglect, 2008).

As demonstrated in that arena, claiming to have all the answers precludes the possibility of asking new questions to enable learning. Politicians and economists exhibit the same tendency with regard to the current economic crisis -- despite the historically unprecedented escalation in the numbers of unemployed as a conequence of their policies (12 Mindsets Ensuring Disappearance of Employment Opportunities, 2012). Why waste time -- exhibiting doubt and uncertainty to those who expect the provision of answers to be a primary characteristic of leadership (The Future of Leadership: reframing the unknown, 1994). To what extent does strategic leadership require the capacity to ask new questions, to encourage such questions to be asked, and to embody the negative capability extolled by the poet John Keats?

Is it possible to identify the new questions of value through which current leadership has reframed the challenges of the times? Is a leader to be remembered by the questions asked? Alternatively, is the historical legacy of a leader who failed to respond creatively to such challenges to be best recognized through a particular question that was not asked?

What questions can the present ask that makes a mockery of the past and frames it as quaint -- perhaps worthy of the ridicule in which it is currently held? What questions may the future then ask that will frame the present as quaint -- perhaps worthy of ridicule in its turn?

Why is it that a commerical group, Dassault Systems -- part of the Dassault Group, reknowned for its manufacture of military equipment -- should have launched a worlwide media campaign under the slogan If we ask the right questions, we can change the world? Can one imagine this being done by any part of the United Nations system, the European Commission, or any government?