Higher order questioning

Engaging with Questions of Higher Order: cognitive vigilance required for higher degrees of twistedness (Part #11)

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The concern above with problematic questions and missing dimensions raises the question of whether the "information retrieval" stimulus is unduly biasing the approach to questions. It is clear that there are domains of questioning (as in Stone's court case example) where it is the capacity of the questioner, answerer and audience which is as much at issue. However any understanding of questions of a "higher order" is challenged by Adam Phillips (An Answer to Questions, 2000) in his comments by A J Ayer's (Language, Truth and Logic, 1936; Logical Positivism, 1959) problematic view of questions as a logic positivist:

For Ayer, logic is a form of hyperbole that can show us the starkest of truths: a question is something that can be answered. If there is no way of answering, then it is not a question that has been asked. "We enquire in every case," he writes, what observations would lead us to answer the question, one way or the other; and, if none can be discovered, we must conclude that the sentence under consideration does not, as far as we are concerned, express a genuine question, however strongly its grammatical appearance may suggest that it does....

For Ayer, genuine questions have answers; for the psychoanalyst I describe, the problem with the question is its need for an answer. The philosopher and the psychoanalyst seek different satisfactions. The psychoanalyst wants to persuade us that there is a satisfaction in asking, and going on asking; the philosopher wants to get his asking right. The philosopher and the psychoanalyst agree that people ask, and ask for, what cannot be asked. For the psychoanalyst this is the point, for the philosopher this is the problem. What is not in question is the value of questions, and the value of asking questions about questions. The traditional pursuit of philosophers that Ayer was so dismissive of has been a quest of (and for) questions. What Freud did was to redescribe questions as part of the rhetoric of demand. To ask a question is simply a way of acknowledging to ourselves and other people that we are lacking something.

Tradition of philosophical questioning: J D Casten (Plato: Memory of the Gods, 1994) notes, with respect to the methods of Socrates and Plato, the importance of the distinction between two forms of question and answer. "The maieutic method has often been confused with the dialectic method, the dialectic often dubiously understood to be the method of question and answer" [more | more] . According to Casten:

• Maieutic: In the Theaetetus (149a-151d), Socrates compares himself to a midwife, where the mind may be "in some labor with some thought it has conceived" (151b). Socrates had also noted that "Diotima's own method of inquiry [was] by question and answer" (Symposium, 201e), and other philosophers are noted as using the method as well, e.g. the Eleatic stranger "asking questions, as Parmenides himself did" (Sophist, 217c). Although never explicitly stated, such a method, where the instructor (theoretically) does not hand over knowledge, but assists the student in discovering things for themselves, is congruous with learning being a form of recollection. In this way, we can see the Socratic, or maieutic, method as being a means to agitating and prompting a recollection of the eternal. Such does not necessitate our participation in an exterior dialogue for the gaining of knowledge, as it is noted that "thinking and discourse are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is, precisely, the inward dialogue carried on by the mind with itself without spoken sound" (Sophist, 263e). Thus, one might carry on a maieutic soliloquy with one's self, drawing out wisdom with one's own inner voice, as if in prayer.
• Dialectic: In the Phaedrus (265d-266c), two "procedures" are discussed; one of bringing "a dispersed plurality under a single form" (265d) and the other, a reverse, where one may "divide into forms" (265e)....Together, this spliting and splicing, the cutting and weaving of forms, comprise the dialectic method: "the pair of arts... of universal scope, the art of combining and that of separating" (Statesman 282b)....Although one or the other of these two aspects, pluralizing or unifying, is emphasized at various times, we must remember that "the dialectic art never considers whether the benefit to be derived from the purge is greater or less than to be derived from the sponge" (Sophist 227b-c), "binding... together... [and] separating... off" (Sophist 227c) being equally useful.

For Hans-Georg Gadamer (The Hermeneutic Priority of the Question, Excerpted from Truth and Method, 1975):

It is clear that the structure of the question is implicit in all experience. We cannot have experiences without asking questions.... The essence of the question is to have sense. Now sense involves a sense of direction. Hence the sense of the question is the only direction from which the answer can be given if it is to make sense. A question places what is questioned in a particular perspective.... Among the greatest insights that Plato's account of Socrates affords us is that, contrary to the general opinion, it is more difficult to ask questions than to answer them....To someone who engages in dialogue only to prove himself right and not to gain insight, asking questions will indeed seem easier than answering them. There is no risk that he will be unable to answer a question. In fact, however, the continual failure of the interlocutor shows that people who think they know better cannot even ask the right questions. In order to be able to ask, one must want to know, and that means knowing that one does not know.... For this reason, dialectic proceeds by way of question and answer or, rather, the path of all knowledge leads through the question. To ask a question means to bring into the open. The openness of what is in question consists in the fact that the answer is not settled. It must still be undetermined, awaiting a decisive answer.

Interesting questions: The much-cited approach by Benjamin Bloom to facilitating student understanding of "deeper" questions also raises the question of how "interesting" questions are to be defined -- as opposed to "uninteresting" ones. This is an explicit concern for mathematicians, for example. How are "significant questions" or "non-trivial questions" to be distinguished from "trivial questions"? To what extent does a liberal arts education facilitate the identification of "significant questions", as is claimed? On the other hand, paradoxically, it might be argued that needing a definition of an interesting question might prove to be a mark of inability to use any answer to formulate one.

It might be argued that it is the uninteresting nature of the questions to which society is mainly exposed, notably as a result of dumbing-down by the media, that evokes psycho-social dynamics to expose people to more interesting questions. These may be associated with substance and other forms of abuse and the challenges to which they give rise. It might usefully be asked to what degree the questions to which young people are exposed -- in facing the prospect of adult life -- are perceived by them as interesting.

It might also be argued that a nation may respond more enthusiastically to a leader that exposes them to more interesting questions. It could also be argued that a society that fails to engender interesting questions through its own cultural creativity effectively evokes such challenges through the problems to which it is then exposed (making for "interesting times" as envisaged by the old Chinese curse). This is perhaps a way of understanding the emrgence of "terrorism", "global warming", "AIDS", and the like.

Multiple intelligences: The challenge of identifying interesting questions is also closely related to the challenge of the "super-gifted" -- and of how their insights may best be evoked and related to the challenges of society. It is in this light that it is useful to ask what kinds of question might be asked by the different "intelligences" identified by Howard Gardner (Frames of Mind: the theory of multiple intelligences, 1984) and indeed how is a "question" to be understood from (within) each such perspective:

1. Linguistic intelligence: This is demonstrated by a sensitivity to sounds, rhythms, inflections and meter, a special clarity of awareness of the core operation of language. Such gifts are particularly characteristic of poets; but are said to be universally relevant in order: to use rhetoric in order to convince others; to remember information mnemonically; to explain something clearly to others (even when what is being explained is mathematical, logical or whatever); and to understand language itself. This intelligence is shown to be rooted in the left hemisphere of the brain; and although the right-hemisphere may be used to learn both to read and to speak, such ability will be somewhat restricted.
2. Musical intelligence: Such intelligence has as its centre the relating of emotional and motivational factors to the perceptual ones; music is a way of capturing and communicating feelings and knowledge about feelings. Musical ability is centred in the right-hemisphere of the brain and varies widely among individuals and cultures. It seems to be used in exploring and interpreting other forms of intelligence.
3. Logical/mathematical intelligence: This is developed first from the ability to recognize classes or sets of physical objects; and later by conceptualizing classes or sets of objects or ideas in the mind and understanding logical connections among them. Central features are: the ability to identify and then solve significant problems; memory for repetitive patterns and the ability to compare and operate upon such patterns mentally; and an intuitive feel for logical relationship.
4. Spatial intelligence: An accurate perception of the physical world, an ability to transform or modify these perceptions, and the recreating of certain aspects of visual experience without relevant physical stimuli -these are all part of spatial ability. Centred in the right-hemisphere of the brain, spatial skills are typical of cultures where tracking, hunting and visual recognition of the environment are paramount; but present-day Western culture requires it no less, whether for the architects or the mathematical topologist or the molecular biologist.
5. Bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence: Skill in controlling bodily movements and in the ability to manipulate objects combine in this intelligence, which has been valued in many cultures as the harmony between mind and body - the mind trained to use the body properly and the body to respond to the mind. It reaches its height in dance, which has supernatural connotations in some cultures, and in other performing roles. Low bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence is equated, in India for example, with immaturity.
6. Personal intelligence: These are centred on the concept of the individual self and may be considered as: Access to one's own feeling life - this is the development of the internal aspects of a person and the ability to detect and symbolize complex and highly differentiated sets of feelings. Ability to notice and make distinctions among individuals - to read even the hidden intentions and desires of others and to use this knowledge to influence their behaviour. Development of these intelligences leads to self-maturity and to personal knowledge of one's self as a unique individual.

The last form of intelligence also raises the question of the nature of questions formulated by emotional intelligence as explored by Daniel Goleman (Emotional Intelligence, 1996) defined as "the ability to monitor one's own and others' emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use the information to guide one's thinking and actions".

Cultural mindscapes: Just as an "information retrieval" perspective may respond primarily to the questions of only some of the above intelligences, a further complication is introduced by the cultural framing of the questioning process as explored by Magoroh Maruyama (Mindscapes, social patterns and future development of scientific theory types, 1980). He distinguishes four epistemological mindscapes:

• H-mindscape (homogenistic, hierarchical, classificational): Parts are subordinated to the whole, with subcategories neatly grouped into supercategories. The strongest, or the majority, dominate at the expense of the week values, policies, problems, priorities, etc). Logic is deductive and axiomatic demanding sequential reasoning. Cause-effect relations may be deterministic or probabilistic.
• I-mindscape (heterogenistic, individualistic, random): Only individuals are real, even when aggregated into society. Emphasis on self-sufficiency, independence and individual values. Design favours the random, the capricious and the unexpected. Scheduling and planning are to be avoided. Non-random events are improbable. Each question has its own answer; there are no universal principles.
• S-mindscape (heterogenistic, interactive, homeostatic): Society consists of heterogeneous individuals who interact non-hierarchically to mutual advantages. Mutual dependency. Differences are desirable and contribute to the harmony of the whole. Maintenance of the natural equilibrium. Values are interrelated and cannot be rank-ordered. Avoidance of repetition. Causal loops. Categories not mutually exclusive. Objectivity is less useful than "cross-subjectivity" or multiple viewpoints. Meaning is context dependent.
• G-mindscape (heterogenistic, interactive, morphogenetic): Heterogeneous individuals interact non-hierarchically for mutual benefit, generating new patterns and harmony. Nature in continually changing requiring allowance for change. Values interact to generate new values and meanings. Values of deliberate (anticipatory) incompleteness. Causal loops. Multiple evolving meanings.

It might usefully be assumed that within each of these mindscapes the nature of both question and answer are understood differently from that within the currently dominant intellectual paradigm conditioning search engine design. Frameworks distinct from those of Howard Gardner and Magoroh Maruyama also merit attention (see Systems of Categories Distinguishing Cultural Biases, 1993).

Questions of praxis: Another approach to distinguishing the qualities of higher order questions is through domains of praxis and the nature of questions to which they give rise, where the challenge is as much "art" as "science":

• Existential, philosophical and spiritual questions: these raise issues of dimensionality, the identity and capacity of the questioner and the questionee, and notions of relevance. At their most challenging they may take the form of paradoxes, exemplified by the questions implicit in Taoist "crazy wisdom" (cf Chuang Tzu) and the Zen koan. Koans are not rational questions with final linear conclusions, rather they are especially designed to open the mind that has been closed by habitual responses to the world and reality.
• Terrestrial aliens: these raise questions about the cultural and linguistic significance of the questions and answers, especially when the "aliens" are merely those of a different generation
• Extraterrestrial aliens: hypothetically these draw attention to problems concerning the nature of questions in non-terrestrial contexts and the possibility of other appraoches to eleiciting information (see Communicating with Aliens: the Psychological Dimension of Dialogue, 2000)
• Sustainability: the strategic dilemmas associated with sustainability place focus greater attention on the framing of understanding from which appropriate balance can be distinguished and maintained -- partly epitomized by the challenges of gardening (see Psychology of Sustainability: Embodying cyclic environmental processes, 2002)
• Education: this raises issues about acquisition of culture and the conceptual skills necessary to survive and thrive in an increasingly turbulent world (see Attitude Entrainment: Communicating thrival skills and insights, 2004)
• Commerce: here the focus is on questions that will detect (or frame) bargaining opportunities for trading advantage
• Strategic and military: the "war against terrorism" has demonstrated the inadequacy of the intelligence framing questions appropriate to the dimensions of the challenge (see Transforming the Encounter with Terrorism, 2003). As noted by George J. Stein (Information Warfare, 1995): "We do not yet have a strategy of information warfare, and we have not answered the higher-order questions of how we would reorganize, retrain, and reequip for third-wave warfare".
• Personal relationships: the amazingly problematic dynamics of personal relationships focus attention on the need for another order and quality of question
• Kinetic: dancing, wind surfing, skateboarding, martial arts ***
• Creativity and aesthetics: the questions associated with creativity, whether its evocation or in response to the aesthetic of its products, may be of a radically different type
• Risk and threat: streetwise **

Each of the above suggests the possibility of presenting each domain against a set of question types to distinguish the mix of questions on which each is dependent. In the case of sport, this might be done for a wide variety of sports (eg judo, mountaineering, snorkeling, paragliding, speleology). These concerns with disciplins very broadly understood are in sympathy with the approach of philosopher Paul Feyerabend (Against Method, 1975) for whom "all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits" (see Beyond Method: engaging opposition in psycho-social organization, 1981)

Questions about questions: There is therefore a case for asking questions about questions in ways for which information retrieval systems are not designed:

• If a question may be understood as an openness to uncertainty or to the unknown, how is a higher order question to be understood? To what kind of uncertai!nty is it open?
• How many questions (and of what type) are required to avoid vulnerability and an endangered integrity -- and how is this reconciled with openness to change (and mutation)?
• Is the relationship between fundamental questions, and their integrity as a set, to be understood in terms of a form of triangulation (analogous to that of topographical surveys)?
• Does each discipline effectively represent a key question, exemplified by each of the different "disciples", or "knights", at any archetypal roundtable?
• How are the complementarities within a set of questions to be understood?
• How does a question both emerge from a dynamic as well as engendering a dynamic?
• What is the relationship between a key question and vital feedback systemically understood as part of a feedback loop?
• How is the necessary set of questions to be understood under conditions where failure to ask the "final question" or "key question" in the set may leave one "exposed", in an unstable state, or susceptible to being attracted into a "learning experience" -- possibly unwelcome ?
• How is nature of the "final question", prior to commitment to a high risk major enterprise or contract, to be understood? How then are meta-questions about the rules to be asked and answered? (Xavier Sallantin ***)

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