Pathological correspondences?

Theories of Correspondences -- and potential equivalences between them in correlative thinking (Part #8)

Delusions: Readily to be understood as "pathological" are beliefs in "correspondences" judged to be inappropriate. Delusions typically occur in the context of neurological or mental illness. Those who hold them may be, partly as a result, confined to psychiatric institutions. The issue of the qualifications of who makes such an assessment and how their criteria are determined is another matter. Many people were so confined in Soviet Russia because of the "inappropriateness" of their ideological associations. The main criteria for a belief to be considered delusional are: certainty (held with absolute conviction), incorrigibility (not changeable by compelling counterargument or proof to the contrary), impossibility or falsity of content (implausible, bizarre or patently untrue). A major difficulty occurs with the application of such criteria to individuals or groups whose innovative insights subsequently come to be held as correct -- where it is the "conviction" of the majority that comes to be recognized as having been deluded, where the "incorrigibility" was a pathological characteristic of the previously dominant views, and where the "implausibility" is subsequently demonstrated to be plausible. The case of Galileo Galilei offers a useful example. The question is what extant insights, framed as deluded ("moonshine") by mainstream views, will at some future time offer an analogous demonstration of delusional dimensions to currently dominant thinking?

Given that delusions are of particular diagnostic importance in psychotic disorders and particularly in schizophrenia, it might be asked to what degree modern civilization is to be diagnosed as "schizophrenic" in the light of the virtually complete separation between the "algebraic" and "symbolist" correspondences and equivalences noted above. This would suggest that the very absence of any sense of equivalence between those two sets of "correspondences" is likely to be considered a pathological symptom by the future.

Mad politicians: It is typical of political discourse for those of one political persuasion to perceive, and to caricature, those of some other persuasion as to some degree "mad" in the light of the inappropriate conclusions they draw and for the inappropriate relationships they detect between issues in society. This is exemplified by the constituencies centred on "Davos" and those centred on "Porto Alegre" (All Blacks of Davos vs All Greens of Porto Alegre: reframing global strategic discord through polyphony? 2007). Here of course there is the question of whether the conclusions are an indication of pathological thinking or whether the "contradictions" detected are indicative of pathological relationships between psychosocial conditions.

Mad scientists: Also interesting is the case of "scientists" considered in some way to be "mad". Curiously whilst Wikipedia has a whole entry on mad scientists, and a separate list of mad scientists, in both cases these deal specifically and solely with fictional archetypes -- "Doctor Strangeloves". No reference is made to the delicate matter of determining which non-fictional "scientists" are to be considered "mad" -- specifically because of the inappropriateness of the correspondences which they believe merit consideration. However Wikipedia does have an entry on fringe science which is presumably an attractor for those who indulge in correspondences that might appropriately be considered pathological -- by mainstream science. But how, and why, is that to be distinguished from protosciences? What proportion of scientific geniuses would be judged to be psychologically deeply disturbed -- and why is so little effort made to document the inappropriate correspondences they find meaningful? Which of them is indeed to be caricatured as "nutty as a fruitcake"?

As noted earlier, Isaac Newton (President of the Royal Society) has been variously caricatured as borderline mad for his bizarre attempts to reconcile mathematics and theology. This raises interesting questions about how "mad" should now be considered those scientists who are believers in "creationism" or "intelligent design".

Given the role of mathematics in the design of places of worship, and their symbolic significance, it is puzzling that "mathematical theology" is not seen as a potential response to some of the profound issues that violently divide faiths such as Islam and Judaism, as discussed elsewhere (And When the Bombing Stops? Territorial conflict as a challenge to mathematicians, 2000). Such explorations might be considered especially relevant given the numerology associated with "end times" scenarios and the significance attached to "72 virgins" by fundamentalist suicide bombers -- and the fatal consequences of acting on such beliefs. If correlative thinking is to be judged as the "twaddle of idiots", one wonders how the future will judge the "scientists" who currently design the weaponry for any "clash of civilizations".

As one designer of weaponry, Leonardo da Vinci might be caricatured as "mad" for the relevance he saw in painting such works as Mona Lisa -- although how this criterion is to be reconciled with the ability of scientists to appreciate beauty is problematic given its exclusion from scientific methodology. How to justify the Mad Scientists Collective -- a group of Silicon Valley techies who engage in art projects at Burning Man -- or the International Society of Mad Scientists? How pathologically symptomatic was the indulgence of world-renowned physicist Richard Feynman in bongo playing, for which he was reputed? If such activity is to be considered "re-creation", how is the process of "re-creation" to be related to the science for which he was reputed? Scientists, as scientists, do not "re-create" and the process is not held to be part of the scientific method. If it is to be considered as a valued indication of their "humanity", then maybe other processes, deprecated within mainstream science, are also essential to being "human". Possibly it is the ability to reconcile such seemingly disparate domains which is the basis for a more integrative science of the future -- as possibly anticipated by such as Leonardo da Vinci and Isaac Newton?

As noted elsewhere (Avoiding Dialogue with Alternative Worldviews at any Cost, 2005), the existential timidity in the face of "extreme dialogue" is unworthy of a civilization "reaching for the stars" and potentially dependent on fusion energy. The latter is famously dependent on the craziest "Theories of Everything", as illustrated by the much-quoted statement by Niels Bohr in response to Wolfgang Pauli: "We are all agreed that your theory is crazy. The question which divides us is whether it is crazy enough to have a chance of being correct. My own feeling is that is not crazy enough." To that Freeman Dyson added:

"When a great innovation appears, it will almost certainly be in a muddled, incomplete and confusing form. To the discoverer, himself, it will be only half understood; to everyone else, it will be a mystery. For any speculation which does not at first glance look crazy, there is no hope!" (Innovation in Physics, Scientific American, 199, No. 3, September 1958)

"Pathological religion": The early understanding in Vedic correlative thinking -- caricatured as the "twaddle of idiots" -- that the Upanishads were an articulation of correlations, may be usefully constrasted with current understanding of religion as establishing a connection with the divine. Although the Abrahamic religions notably stress the manner in which man is made "in the image of God" (Genesis 1:26), the "correlative" characterististics of this "connection" would appear only to be currently represented in figurative representations of a bearded male deity (or in the obscure understandings of mysticism). It might then be asked whether the "connectivity" emphasized by such religion should be considered as a pathologically limited understanding of a more complex "correlative" understanding of the nature of such a relationship.

This raises the issue of the nature and the extent of connectivity in the pattern of correspondences perceived as characteristic of cult thinking. What kinds and degrees of connectivity and correlation within spiritually-oriented groups are to be considered pathological?

Agreement vs Disagreement: The above examples raise the more general issue of the degree to which:

agreement is to be considered pathological as a consequence of any inappropriate relationships on which it is grounded. This is exemplified in the case of perceptions of cults and groupthink (Groupthink: the Search for Archaeoraptor as a Metaphoric Tale missing the link between "freedom fighters" and "terrorists", 2002 ). To what extent does this apply to the problematic relationships between disciplines (Dynamically Gated Conceptual Communities: emergent patterns of isolation within knowledge society, 2004)? How "pathological" is a community defined by a set of mutually acceptable correspondences -- considered questionable by others? However this raises the more general question of whether any dominant or mainstream mindset will be considered by the future as having been characterized by dependence on such pathological correspondences -- as the current mainstream arrogantly frames the deprecated correlative thinking of the past.
disagreement is to be perceived as exemplifying pathological rejection of correspondences considered "normal" in favour of others that are held -- from such a "normal" perspective -- to be "abnormal" or "extremist". But to the extent that contrasting "types" and "modes" of thinking are held to exemplify the diversity of the human community, are such types effectively defined by perceptions of the "pathological" nature of the correspondences held to be valid by the other? Does this provide a "scientific" explanation for the arguments of such as Richard Dawkins (The God Delusion, 2006) suggesting that any views that are "unscientific" are necessarily based on attaching "pathological" credence to correspondences and correlations that science (currently) considers to be meaningless?

Is it the case that those who disagree with the "positive" correspondences recognized by "my community" are necessarily to be seen as cultivating "negative" pathological correspondences (cf Being Positive Avoiding Negativity Management challenge of positive vs negative, 2005)? It would appear that this conclusion is held to be self-evident in the discourse in support of the intervention of the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq to "spread democracy" -- just as it is evident in the views held by some fundamentalists regarding the legitimacy of subjecting apostates to physical sanction for rejection of their community.

To what extent should agreement and disagreement be considered part of a process -- requiring careful consideration to be given to how correspondences are labelled pathological and by whom during the course of that process?

Moonshine? As noted elsewhewhere (Postmodernism and cognitive discontinuity, 2006), in exploring the significance of catastrophe theory for any "cognitive feel", and given Rene Thom's generalization of morphogenesis to include semantic dimensions, there is a case for noting speculation on intersection between the controversial work on morphogenetic fields and quantum gravity. Writing as a physicist, Alan D. Sokal (For Transgressing the Boundaries: towards a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity, Social Text, 1996) provides a helpful introduction to the language used:

Finally, an exciting proposal has been taking shape over the past few years in the hands of an interdisciplinary collaboration of mathematicians, astrophysicists and biologists: this is the theory of the morphogenetic field. [Rupert Sheldrake, et al]. Since the mid-1980's evidence has been accumulating that this field, first conceptualized by developmental biologists, is in fact closely linked to the quantum gravitational field: (a) it pervades all space; (b) it interacts with all matter and energy, irrespective of whether or not that matter/energy is magnetically charged; and, most significantly, (c) it is what is known mathematically as a "symmetric second-rank tensor". All three properties are characteristic of gravity; and it was proven some years ago that the only self-consistent nonlinear theory of a symmetric second-rank tensor field is, at least at low energies, precisely Einstein's general relativity. Thus, if the evidence for (a), (b) and (c) holds up, we can infer that the morphogenetic field is the quantum counterpart of Einstein's gravitational field. Until recently this theory has been ignored or even scorned by the high-energy-physics establishment, who have traditionally resented the encroachment of biologists (not to mention humanists) on their "turf". However, some theoretical physicists have recently begun to give this theory a second look, and there are good prospects for progress in the near future.

The author later revealed the article to be a hoax (A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies, Lingua Franca, May/June 1996), to the embarassment of many exploring this intersection, and reinforcing the view of sceptics (cf Sokal Hoax, The Sceptics Dictionary).

Of relevance to the discussion regarding the validity of any "correspondences" is the discontinuity in cognitive space that the disagreement regarding the hoax highlights -- ironically implied by Sokal's original title "transgressing the boundaries". The implication is that for physics there are boundaries that should not be transgressed -- an implication seemingly contrary to the basic premiss of complexity theory regarding the dynamic interconnectedness of everything.

An entry in the FreeDictionary on the Sokal Affair points to limitations in any comments by a qualified physicist on philosophical issues on which he is not comparably qualified (and makes no claims to be):

Mathematician Gabriel Stoltzenberg has written a number of essays with the stated purpose of "debunking" the claims made by Sokal and his allies. He argues that Sokal and company do not possess a sufficient understanding of the philosophical positions that they criticize and that this lack of understanding renders their criticisms meaningless. Defenders of Sokal have responded that postmodernists have a vested interest in denying the validity of his criticisms, which could not be accepted without serious harm to many careers and incomes.

In passing, Flemming Funch (Quantum Physics and Elections, 2004) usefully notes with regard to the hoax that:

Actually, the crux of the matter seems to be that Sokal believes in one finite objective reality, so therefore he considers all other views unscientific, and he tried to prove that point by satirizing them.... Maybe the joke is that mutually exclusive views on the world can all be right, because you do essentially get back what you start off trying to prove.....For the first group to consider themselves right, they have to consider the second group wrong, as there can only be one objective reality. Whereas the opposite isn't particularly the case. Anyway, I choose to bet on the models that explain the most possible phenomena in the world, rather than the models that have to suppress and ridicule all the stuff that just doesn't fit into them.

This points again to the challenge of bridging such cognitive discontinuity. Funch cites Mara Beller (The Sokal Hoax: At Whom Are We Laughing?; Quantum Dialogue: the making of a revolution, 2001) who argues that much of what Sokal was saying (and which he himself considered utterly ridiculous) had been said before by much more respected scientists than himself, like Bohr, Born, Einstein, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler, who had even gone a good deal further in relating theoretical physics concepts to sociology, psychology and politics. Sokal later developed his thesis (Fashionable Nonesense: Intellectual Impostures, 1997). Beller however concluded::

In an exchange several months after his New York Review of Books [3 October 1996] article, Weinberg admitted that the founders of quantum theory had been wrong in their "apparent subjectivism," and declared that "we know better now". What exactly do we know better now? Do we know better that one should not infer from the physical to the political realm -- and if yes, why? Or do we know better that the "orthodox" interpretation of quantum physics -- the one that confidently announced the final overthrow of causality and the ordinary conception of reality -- is not the only possible interpretation, and that, ultimately, it might not even be the surviving one? .... The opponents of the postmodernist cultural studies of science conclude confidently from the Sokal affair that "the emperors ... have no clothes". But who, exactly, are all those naked emperors? At whom should we be laughing?

Sokal's hoax highlights good criticism of transdisciplinary borrowings in terms of the criteria of the conventional scientific method. He effectively rejects as improper the possibility of explanations that rely to a high degree on isomorphism and metaphor -- however much the role of metaphor has been fundamental to scientific creativity. With respect to the value of such borrowings and their relevance to cognitive discontinuity, even among scientistis, it is worth noting the remark of Kenneth Boulding (Ecodynamics; a new theory of societal evolution, 1978):

Our consciousness of the unity of the self in the middle of a vast complexity of images or material structures is at least a suitable metaphor for the unity of a group, organization, department, discipline, or science. If personification is only a metaphor, let us not despise metaphors - we might be one ourselves. (p.345)

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Pathological correspondences?