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Existential subtlety of radical intangibles
Radical Innovators Beware -- in the arts, sciences and philosophy (Part #3)
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The table above helps to focus attention on the subtlety of what may be implied (as variously noted in the papers cited below.
How to think about what is implied by radical, given the synonyms and connotations? What is radical originality or radical creativity? What is imagination, insight, or any vision that may be associated with them -- readily to be understood as "radical" and "extreme", and admired as such? The same may be asked of terror, fear and anxiety -- readily to be deprecated as such, or cultivated in the process of daily recreation and entertainment.
It is intriguing to note how little effort the French initiative makes to define its stated preoccupation with radicalisation and terrorism. It is either assumed that these subtleties require no definition, or else it is assumed that they are whatever the initiative chooses to address -- effectively by government fiat. The lack of consensus on the matter is striking, most notably the failure of United Nations processes in that regard.
The essence of the challenge might be usefully recognized in the experimental substitution of "change" for XXXX in the template. How indeed is change to be understood in a sociopolitical context? Change is frequently promised by politicians in response to popular demand. In his presentation of the plan, Manuel Valls is however quoted as declaring that: Radicalisation and terrorism are linked. We are faced with a stubborn phenomenon that has widely spread through society and which threatens it because it could expand massively.
Is the more fundamental challenge that Change and fear are linked? Change is widely acknowledged as potentially terrifying. Fear of it is a recognised phobia. Should change agents now be recognised as terrorists -- if not, why not?
An early introduction to the phenomenon by Don D. Jackson (The Fear of Change, Medical Opinion and Review, 3, 1967) indicates:
In a world that to some observers is wildly chaotic, it may appear absurd to postulate that the primary flaw in the modern condition is fear of change. Our economic, political, religious, social, psychological, and biological systems are torn by the continual tug-of-war waged by conflicting tendencies. The thrust forward, the push toward change, renewal, and growth, is violently or stubbornly resisted by an equal will to maintain what is and has been, reinforced by rigid personal, interpersonal, and cultural systems grounded in fear of the unknown.
How is enabling "change" for survival then to be disassociated from adopting a "radical" perspective -- leading to radical measures -- which some will indeed find fearful? Following this logic, given that politicians do indeed promise change, to what extent should politicians be "re-cognised" as terrorists, or distinguished from them?
The question can be expressed otherwise through questioning how change is to be distinguished from "learning" -- or related to it. Might learning itself be considered terrifying to some in some way? Helpful in this respect is the distinction made between "maintenance learning", "shock learning" and "innovative learning" in an early report to the Club of Rome (James Botkin, et al., No Limits to Learning: bridging the human gap, 1979), as critically reviewed separately (Societal Learning and the Erosion of Collective Memory, 1980). More recently the contrast is articulated with language relevant to this argument (Radical and Incremental Innovation, The Innovation Policy Platform; Incremental Innovation vs. Radical Innovation, Incremental Innovation; Donald A. Norman and Roberto Verganti, Incremental and Radical Innovation: design research versus technology and meaning change, 2012).
Is it the shock factor which is so valuable as a catalyst to innovative learning in the radical modality -- in contrast to the maintenance approach so questionably promoted by public authorities whilst awaiting "surprises", as so remarkably analyzed by Nassim Nicholas Taleb (The Black Swan: the impact of the highly improbable, 2007)?
Definition? A valuable review of the lack of consensus regarding both radicalism and terrorism is provided by Randy Borum (Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories, Journal of Strategic Security 4, 2011). This argues that:
In discourse about countering terrorism, the term "radicalization" is widely used, but remains poorly defined. To focus narrowly on ideological radicalization risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy -- or at least a necessary precursor -- for terrorism, though we know this not to be true. Different pathways and mechanisms of terrorism involvement operate in different ways for different people at different points in time and perhaps in different contexts.... Most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many terrorists -- even those who lay claim to a "cause" -- are not deeply ideological and may not "radicalize" in any traditional sense.
Borum stresses that:
First, there is little discussion and even less consensus about what "radicalism" and "extremism" even mean. Given that researchers and governments cannot reach consensus in defining terrorism, perhaps it should not be surprising that such a diversity of views exists in defining even more nuanced concepts related to radicalization.... Sometimes the concepts of radicalism and terrorism become conflated.... Little attention has been given in the scholarly or policy literature to defining criteria for which extremist ideologies pose a threat to national or global security, or whether extremist ideologies matter in the absence of violent actions.... just as we struggle with the boundaries of radicalism, we face a similarly complex challenge in operationalizing the concept of "radicalization".
The difficulty highlighted here is that different authorities have asserted what are essentally simplisitic definitions of radicalisation, but without questioning whether the process has more fundamental implications worthy of the most careful attention -- especially if it proving so attractive to the young. Thus the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network explains its focus only the following circuitous terms: Radicalisation in this sense is understood as a complex phenomenon of people embracing radical ideology that could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts.
The questionable approach to authoritative definition has been strikingly evident in the recent debate on the highly questionable definition of torture -- euphemistically defined as "enhanced interrogation" in the USA. This has also been effectively defined by fiat -- as aided and abetted by the US Department of Justice (Phillipe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld's memo and the betrayal of American values, 2008). Definitions have been crafted to enable some highly questionable policy initiatives, carefully excluding dimensions which are a reality for many.
Also of particular relevance is the assertion by Manuel Valls that: The radicalisation of part of our youth, seduced by a deadly antisocial model, is in my view the most serious challenge we have faced since the second world war because it deeply damages the republican pact. How is any definition to emerge when experiencing fear -- even to the point of terror -- is widely sought in the thrill of daily entertainment and recreation -- even acclaimed using the descriptor "terrific"? Even more problematic is the "seductive" nature of exposure to the the fear experienced by others, epitomised by the gladiatorial games of Imperial Rome -- terror cultivated vicariously.
The arbitrary nature of this process of definition can be usefully termed "conceptual gerrymandering" (Conceptual gerrymandering and definitional game-playing, 2002). Curiously, as discussed separately, such "gross" definition is also evident in the case of the economic definition of GDP, despite its fundamental importance to governance (Evaluating the Grossness of Gross Domestic Product, 2016).
Rather than the heavy investment on preventing French youth from being attracted to a terrifying experience in Syria and Iraq, the focus might be more appropriately placed on how that attraction to violence could be better understood, as separately discussed (Global Incomprehension of Increasing Violence: matching incapacity to question the reason why, 2016).
Terror as tangible? The definitional approach is authoritatively justified by the presentation of terrorism in tangible terms (bombings, etc) -- beyond any need to question its nature. This is unfortunately problematic in that it is the fear of incidents of this nature which is essential to the experience of terror. Those affected by the tangible nature of the incidents may well be tragically beyond the ability to experience terror. There is seemingly little understanding of the varieties of fear and terror, or those who engender it, as separately considered (Varieties of Terrorism -- extended to the experience of the terrorized, 2004). The latter included the following sections:
Exclusions: However fearful for those who experience it as unwillng victims, striking examples excluded from any definition of terrorism (as officially recognised) therefore include:
- intimidation and violence in prisons
- intimidation and violence in the home (domestic violence) and between neighbours
- gender-determined intimidation and violence
- racially-determined intimidation and violence
- bullying in institutions (including school shootings, shootings on military bases, etc)
- street violence (muggings, car-jackings, etc)
- organized crime (racketeering, kidnappings, traffic in persons, prostitution, etc)
- corruption, engendering fear through intimidation and blackmail
- violence against animals, possibly associated with systematic intimidation
- terror engendered by wild animals (Unprecedented wave of shark attacks causes terror in North Carolina, The Telegraph, 1 July 2015; Terror down under: Spate of shark attacks keep anxious Aussies out of the water, South China Morning Post, 19 August 2015)
Every effort currently seems to be made to see terrorism -- conventionally framed -- as resulting from a process of radicalisation. The focus is on Islamic radicalisation, careful avoiding any reference to radicalisation with the Christian, Jewish or other denominations. The contrast is hghlighted between the arbitrary (but unquestionable) labelling of the Orlando shooting as the act of a "terrorist", avoiding any implication that the killer of Jo Cox in the same period could in any way be recognized as a "terrorist" -- as carefully argued by Glenn Greenwald (Why Is the Killer of British MP Jo Cox Not Being Called a "Terrorist"? The Intercept, 17 June 2016). This makes the point that:
... it's virtually impossible to find any media outlet calling the attacker a "terrorist" or even suggesting that it might be "terrorism". To the contrary, the suspected killer -- overnight -- has been alternatively described as a gentle soul or a mentally ill "loner"... the word "terrorism" has no real concrete meaning and certainly no consistent application. In the West, functionally speaking, it's now a propaganda term with little meaning other than "a Muslim who engages in violence against Westerners or their allies". It's even used for Muslims who attack soldiers of an army occupying their country... the term "terrorist" at this point has so little cogent meaning that debates about how to apply it seem quaint and completely academic.
There is however clearly the possibility that prior experience of forms of terror -- excluded from that understanding -- may in fact lead to a form of radicalisation. The terror associated with bullying or torture may well trigger a radical change of perspective -- as with the experience of rape. In some cases this may in turn lead to violence. In this sense the experience of violence in prisons, although seldom acknowledged officially, may well engender a terrorist mentality.
Especially interesting is the case of rape and any conversion to radical feminism that it may trigger with respect to attitudes to violence against women. Of particular relevance however is the extent to which this radicalisation may engender a pattern of reciprocated violence against men -- notably as revenge against the original perpetrators -- such as to ensure that they in turn experience equivalent terror.
Also of interest is the manner in which the "violence" triggered by any experience of terror may take non-physical forms. Thus remedial social initiatives to ensure it is not repeated may be experienced, and labelled, as "violent" -- by those who are thereby obliged to modify and constrain their habitual responses. The terror at the prospect of loss of employment (or a reduction in wages endangering an already marginal livelihood) may also engender democratic protest against structural violence -- possibly degenerating into physical violence.
Thus although Manuel Valls can assert that radicalisation and terrorism are linked, it is equally true to explore the extent to which terrorism and radicalisation are linked.
However the manner in which conceptual gerrymandering is used to exclude experience of certain forms of terror from any understanding of "terrorism" is then clearly to be expected in the methodology by which some forms of radical and radicalisation are designed out of the "radicalisation" currently framed as a fundamental security preoccupation through its association with deprecated forms of violence. It is unfortunate that this effectively results in an inability to understand the varieties of radicalisation and the meaning of "violence" -- especially in its most subtle forms, where it may be appreciated as the only means of enabling change or recreation (Global Incomprehension of Increasing Violence: Matching incapacity to question the reason why, 2016).
Examples include violence to nature to acquire food, combat sport, and some forms of interpersonal interaction. Such conceptual gerrymandering has been evident in the questionable definition of enhanced interrogation in contrast to torture, as well as in just war theory -- to the point of implying a "just torture theory", or a "just radicalisation theory". There is the further implication that state-sponsored terrorism is effectively framed by a "just terrorism theory" -- to which freedom fighters of every epoch have presumably subscribed (including those of the French Revolution). In addition to noting recognition of state-sponsored terrorism by a range of countries, Wikipedia offers separate profiles in the case of the USA, Russia (the Soviet Union), and Israel.
Extreme examples? As a strange coincidence, a week after the announcement of the Action Plan, Brussels was the scene of a massive Gay Pride Parade -- gathering together every facet of the LGBT community in Belgium. Acclaimed otherwise as the "epicentre of European terrorism", multiple bands played in many parts of the centre -- most notably in the immediate proximity of the central police station. It can be readily asserted that the lesbian, gay and transgender communities epitomise radical behaviour and sexual extremism to a high degree. Such behaviour is indeed terrifying to some -- ironically exemplified by the demonic costumes some participants may choose to wear on such occasions, as at any carnival. How is such "terror" to be distinguished from "terrorism" -- especially when cultivated in a carnival setting? How is any decision to "come out", or to "change gender", to be contrasted with other "radical" decisions? Is the increasing attractiveness of doing so (for some) now to be recognised as "radicalisation" -- as with any Gay Pride Parade?
The example is highly relevant to the French situation, given the very recent major political crisis in France regarding the right of homosexuals to marry (Nicolas Sarkozy calls for repeal of France's same-sex marriage law, The Guardian, 16 November 2014; The French Defy Socialists over Gay Marriage, Crisis, 12 June 2013; Marriage for All France, The Huffington Post, 2 February 2016). Considered by some to be an abnormally reprehensible relationship, the arguments made against this bear careful comparison with those made regarding radicalisation, as discussed separately (Marrying an Other whatever the Form: reframing and extending the understanding of marriage, 2013).
The Paris attacks of 2015, which provoked the new Action Plan, were triggered by Islamic reaction to the blasphemy attributed to satirical cartoons in the French magazine Charlie Hebdo. The justification was variously considered ridiculous by French society. Curiously, in the week following announcement of the plan, a major concert on the occasion of commemoration of the centenary of the Battle of Verdun was cancelled as being a risk to public order. This followed a high level of controversy provoked by the extreme right and others. The event was seen as an insult to the commemoration -- framed as "spitting on" an iconic war memorial. This perception was evoked by the intention of a celebrated rapper to sing a song there using the term kuffar -- a highly derogatory term in Arabic, meaning infidel -- employed by jihadist groups to describe Westerners (France cancels rap show at WWI centenary after far-right objects, France 24, 14 May 2016; Verdun: le concert de Black M annulé, L'Est Républicain, 13 mai 2016). How should these different forms of "blasphemy" be compared?
Transformation of "terrorist": Given the pattern by which "terrorists" have been transformed into national icons in many countries -- even in recent decades -- of particular interest in the case of France is how the Reign of Terror (1793-94) is to be understood. During that period some 15,000 to 30,000 people were guillotined -- as a direct consequence of the French Revolution through which the French Republic emerged.
In that respect, far more problematic are the repeated recent arguments by the French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, that any attempt to explain jihadism is already a step towards justifying it. Clearly a "bad career move" for any researcher dependent on government funding. He goes further in calling into question any cultural or sociological commentary with regard to the attacks in France. This attempt to equate understanding with excuse has subsequently been criticized (Sonya Faure, et al., "Culture de l'excuse"?: les sociologues répondent à Valls, Libération, 12 janvier 2016). This notes that: Cette dynamique est une régression intellectuelle qui va de pair avec une politique basée sur la construction d'ennemis. Previous condemnation of government deradicalisation strategies had been made in the UK (Robert Verkreik, Government deradicalisation plan will brand Muslims with beards as terrorists, say academics, The Independent, 10 July 2015).
The Action Plan presented by Manuel Valls may well offer the possibility of fruitful speculation on how it might have been appreciated by Louis XVI, and whether he might himself have chosen to formulate such a plan in response to social unrest in France prior to the Revolution. The plan also invites speculation as to whether it would have been similarly appreciated by those encouraging such extensive use of the guillotine thereafter (Maximilien Robespierre, and others).
In their crafted strategic preoccupation with "terrorism", authorities may well be blind to fear engendered otherwise -- and may well be systematic in their denial of it as systematic rather than incidental (as instanced by sexual abuse by Catholic clergy). It could be said that a blinkered approach to terrorism avoids the need to consider the more complex challenges of forms of fear otherwise engendered in society.
Previous French initiatives against sects and cults: It is appropriate to recognize how the new initiative could be understood as a particular instance of the pattern of controversial initiatives against sects in France, as usefully summarized in the French version of Wikipedia:
Dans le contexte de la polémique et de la lutte contre les sectes, qui a pris une ampleur internationale depuis le début des années 1980, la France s'est engagée dans une lutte dont l'objectif fut d'abord de "lutter contre les sectes" puis "de réprimer les dérives sectaires". La France est un pays laïque dont l'état doit respecter tous les cultes et n'en reconnaître aucun; les mouvements spirituels sont donc a priori considérés comme licites et seuls leurs délits sont répréhensibles. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs commissions d'enquêtes ont été initiées à l'Assemblée nationale afin d'enquêter de manière plus approfondie sur le phénomène sectaire. Le gouvernement s'est également doté d'un nouvel organisme interministériel appelé "Mils" quand il était question de "lutte contre les sectes" puis "Miviludes" pour "réprimer les dérives sectaires". La commission parlementaire... a publié en 1995 une liste de 173 mouvements jugés sectaires et proposé des modifications de législation qui ont mené au vote de la loi About-Picard en 2001. La liste de sectes, très controversée, a été officiellement abandonnée par la circulaire du 27 mai 2005 relative à la lutte contre les dérives sectaires. [Lutte antisectes en France]
The question is what has been learned by French authorities from that process. Especially interesting in that regard is the exclusion of certain "sects" from these preoccupations, especially those secret societies to which a significant number of those in power belong.
Repeating historical patterns? With respect to the complex subtleties of belief against which authorities have endeavoured to act in the past, insights may be gained from the sets of heresies identified at different times by different religions as exemplifying reprehensible radical thinking and thereby providing definitions of heretics and apostates (see List of Christian heresies, Christian heresy in the modern era, Heresy in Judaism).
The French deradicalisation initiative therefore suggests extraordinary parallels to what became the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, following its highly controversial history as the Inquisition in a Europe-wide defence against heresy. It also implies the emergence of a French variant of the deprecated McCarthyism of the USA, namely the practice of making unfair allegations or using unfair investigative techniques, especially in order to restrict dissent or political criticism.
More intriguing is the sense in which the Inquistion of the time would have studied with critical appreciation the Action Plan of Manuel Valls. Are radicals of any persuasion now to be the focus of a new variant of the notorious witch hunts by Christians of various denominations -- despite the long-recognised controversial challenges of reality, imagination, suspicion and allegation in that respect? How indeed is "witch" to be defined and how is "heresy" to be proven? In the desperate quest for radicals as the source of modern ills, the question invites a provocative comparison between "witchcraft" and the "which-craft" by which the radical threat is now to be authoritatively framed, with every necessary legal justification. English enables the useful play on words -- which radical is which -- highlighting the probability of inappropriate response to some (as being a "witch").
Is it to be anticipated that France will produce an analogue to the primary manual of the Inquisition, the notorious Malleus Maleficarum (1487), as variously translated (Christopher S. Mackay, The Hammer of the Witches: a complete translation of the Malleus Maleficarum, 2009; Montague Summers, The Hammer of the Witches: The Malleus Maleficarum of Kramer and Sprenger, 1948)? Its particular focus on the "putting to the question" of suspects through water torture was indeed used in France through to the 18th century -- now resuscitated in the USA as waterboarding and its variants.
Is there now a case for a "Hammer of the Radicals", as The New Times (1816-28) was described under the editorship of John Stoddart? Of some relevance, the latter also translated a review of the Executive Directorate of the French Revolution (Joseph Despaze, Les Cinq hommes: Vie privée des membres du Directoire, ou les Puissants tels qu'ils sont, 1796). The appropriateness of the hammer metaphor in the case of current US policy has however been usefully challenged by William deB. Mills (Hammering Islamic Radicals, MWC News: media with conscience, 2 February 2010), arguing:
So I am not convinced that all Islamic radical political activists must automatically be labeled as enemies of the U.S. (though the U.S. certainly has the power to make them its enemies). However, even if one does so label them, it may still be the case that the U.S. needs a different approach. Battling Islamic radicalism is like battling with glass. Smash it, and it fractures into millions of very sharp splinters. Maybe the U.S. needs a better tool than a hammer.
Is there a sense in which the Action Plan could be understood as a form of Trojan horse to further the agenda of a "Catholic-Nationalist complex" -- or perhaps a "Christian-Populist" complex -- in the light of the warnings regarding the "military-industrial complex"?
This recalls the relevance of the radical insight of George Santayana: Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
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