Warping the Judgement of Dissenting Opinion: towards a general framework for comparing distortion in rules of evidence

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Introduction

This study arose from a search for a comparative overview of the different ways that evidence may be distorted. The purpose is to find a means of positioning the evidence used in current efforts by western countries to justify curtailing civil liberties and due process in response to terrorism. The three approaches to comparing evidence envisaged here are:

• kinds of evidence that may be distorted and the fallacies to which this may give rise
• examples from different historical and socio-political contexts as case studies, and notably by
• extending the coverage to include legal, scientific and other concerns with evidence

The conclusion was initially foreseen in the form of a table of case studies from a variety of sectors and times with an indication of the incidence of particular forms of distortion in the face of dissent. Such a table would help to give a sense of the diversity of forms of evidence to which appeal is made.

Following inability to locate such a comparative table via the web, the intention has been reframed to indicate the possible content of such a table and what might be learnt from it, through indicating many links to possibly relevant sources. A special concern is clarifying the nature of 'chains of evidence' under a variety of circumstances -- especially where major significance is attached to contrasting value perspectives. The intention was to go beyond the focus of Amnesty International on the standards of fair trial and also look at judgements regarding dissenting opinion in extra-legal contexts (including science, medicine, insurance, religion, etc).

More generally however the concern here is with competing efforts to occupy the moral high ground and to misrepresent dissenting views in such a way as to preclude any form of dialogue -- notably through use of terms such as 'rejectionist'. Dissidence may take religious form but may also be evident in political dissent -- possibly to be considered as dangerously associated with 'terrorists'. R Scott Appleby has extended the connotations to jihad warriors as 'uncompromising rejectionists who oppose all peace accords, negotiated settlements and power-sharing agreements' [more]. Use of the term has been queried in the case of Northern Ireland: 'It seems that those who oppose the continuation of British Rule or the legitimacy of the British to impose any foreign partitionist document on the People of Ireland are now "rejectionist's" or "republican rejectionists" [more; The term is being used against both sides of the Oslo peace process [more] and against opponents of any form of military intervention [more]. It is noteworthy that such an authority as John Ruggie (formerly Dean of School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University), in his capacity of UN Assistant Secretary-General, has introduced the term into United Nations parlance in order to frame civil society bodies opposing both globalization and the reframed UN relations with the business community [more; This recalls the emergence in centuries past of 'Protestant' and 'nonconformist', and the condemnation of 'unbelievers' and 'infidels' by various religions as a prelude to religious wars [more;

The emerging international approach to dissent is especially regrettable in that many civil society bodies endeavour to articulate views distinct from dominant policies -- as part of their complementary role in democratic society. It would also be regrettable if 'nongovernmental organizations' -- so labelled by the United Nations -- were to be reframed as 'anti-governmental organizations' if they fail to indicate their unquestioning allegiance to government programmes such as the military action in Afghanistan, and that proposed for other countries. Failure to handle dissenting views appropriately is seen here as dangerous to social processes and especially ironic on the occasion of the United Nations (2001).

A very general framework is required to show how rules of evidence may differ under various circumstances. In support of such an initiative, the creation of an International Agency for Standards of Evidence is proposed (below). As a simple illustration of the challenge, 'evidence' is misleadingly translated by the same word in French -- where 'évidence' signifies that which is obvious.

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