Identity within a qualitative context

Reimagining Principles Enabling an Existential Ecostery (Part #4)

A sense of globality provides a context for a sense of identity -- of identity and presence in the moment. This is a mode of participation in globality which can be variously explored (Geometry, Topology and Dynamics of Identity: cognitive implication in fundamental strategic questions and dilemmas, 2009; Identity, Possessive World-making and their Transformation Dynamics, 2012).

Qualitative influences: Engendering identity, with all its subtlety and possibly requisite underdefinition, implies a configuration of distinct influences in relation to which it emerges and by which it is held or mirrored -- suggesting a degree of self-reflexivity (Hilary Lawson, Reflexivity: the post-modern predicament, 1985).

As "influences" these may be experienced as contrasting qualities understood in generic terms, a conflation of what may be carried by the distinctions variously made (for those so inclined) within sets of:

gods (pantheons), angels (orders), muses, and the like
principles, laws
psychological and cultural archetypes, myths (Labours of Hercules, Knights of Roundtable, life lessons, etc)
topologically framed entities and dynamics (transformations, archetypal morphologies, centro-symmetric polyhedra, etc)
aesthetic styles (rajas)
puzzles, riddles, questions, aphorisms, koans (as with the Mumonkan)
systemic functions
transformations of light
circlets of beads (rosaries, mala beads)
sets of fables (Aesop, Mullah Nasruddin, Jataka)

The possibility has been previously explored to some degree (Representation, Comprehension and Communication of Sets: the Role of Number, 1978; Patterns of N-foldness; comparison of integrated multi-set concept schemes as forms of presentation, 1984).

Reference to "gods" is appropriate in that the qualities originally associated with them tend now to be recognized as "values" -- especially in a secular society. Reference to "angels" is usefully provocative, aside from any belief accorded to them, given other commentary with that focus (Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine Bateson, Angels Fear: towards an epistemology of the sacred, 2004: Matthew Fox and Rupert Sheldrake, The Physics of Angels: exploring the realm where science and spirit meet, 1996; M. D. Faber, The Psychological Roots of Religious Belief: searching for angels and the parent-god, 2004).

Comprehending distinctions: Irrespective of terminology, the fundamental issue is how any array of qualitative distinctions is to be experienced when "compressed" or "conflated" to sets of a particular size -- in contrast with the need to articulate those qualities within sets of larger size to recognize those distinctions adequately. The issue plays out (as noted below) between sets:

of smaller size (perhaps 7 or less), purportedly lending themselves to comprehension and memorability, but in which the conflation reinforces confusion and conflicting interpretations
of larger size (typically more than 7), frustrating ability to comprehend the set as a whole and requiring successive exploration (or neglect) of parts thereof

Conflation of qualities necessarily requires that the distinctions between them then become implicit. By contrast, their articulation through distinct names (for example) renders them explicit (to some degree) -- as in the case of the 99 Names of Allah. Engaging with the implicit in contrast to the explicit has been a theme explored by David Bohm (Wholeness and the Implicate Order, 1980; The Undivided Universe, 1993). Naming is however no guarantee of comprehensibility and may well enable "delusion" (The Consensus Delusion, 2011; Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, 2006; Rupert Sheldrake, The Science Delusion: freeing the spirit of enquiry, 2012).

Requisite complexity: One useful framing of the integrative challenge to comprehension is offered by synthaesthesia as it relates to the senses, but with the implication that this suggests (as a metaphor) the possibility of a form of "cognitive synthaesthesia", possibly to be understood in terms of "cognitive fusion". Any such "framing" obscures the nature of the cognitive challenge. This is perhaps more fruitfully illustrated by the imaginative thinking and subtlety characteristic of fundamental physics -- expressed through articulations comprehensible only to the very few (as with "brane" in M-theory and brane cosmology, envisaged by string theory).

That such subtle complexity should be recognized as essential to explanation of physical reality, raises a fundamental question. Why is it so readily assumed that comprehension and existential engagement with cognitive reality should (necessarily) be of far greater simplicity -- even susceptible to immediate comprehension following only a few words of explanation (possibly in Twitter style)? There is a dangerous expectation that an equivalent of a "pill", a "panacea", or a "silver bullet" is to be found. This question has been separately discussed (Global Brane Comprehension Enabling a Higher Dimensional Big Tent? Strategic implication in encompassing nothing and coming to naught, 2011). It could however be concluded that the comprehensibility of simple discourse -- as widely preferred and practiced -- has proven to be "unfit for purpose" with respect to both the collective challenges of governance and ensuring a qualitatively enhanced lifestyle for all.

It is possible that "the Answer" to the complex strategic challenges of global governance will prove to be inherently incomprehensible to all but the very few. An excellent example is provided by the Gaussian Copula -- a formula widely used for risk analysis in the speculative investment which triggered the current financial crisis. As indicated by its discoverer David X. Li: Very few people understand the essence of the model (Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: the formula that killed Wall Street, Wired, 17.03, March 2009). Other "simple" formulae may be proposed (Uncritical Strategic Dependence on Little-known Metrics: the Gaussian Copula, the Kaya Identity, and what else? 2009).

The elaboration of the argument here can be framed, not so much as the quest for a new "story", as the quest for a "meta-narrative" -- or even a "meta-meta narrative". What is the "story" that interrelates stories about stories -- especially the tales people tell to themselves to explain their circumstances, and notably when they have nothing to do? How does one engage with a meta-meta-narrative and embody it fruitfully?

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Identity within a qualitative context