Monkeying with Global Governance (Part #7)
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The excellent commentary on the news organization case by Roy Greenslade (News Corp's three wise monkeys knew nothing, London Evening Standard, 20 July 2011) notes that the three executives interviewed:
Greenslade argues that their positions lacked credibility given the well-known hands-on governance by Rupert Murdoch in frequent contact with his senior executives -- and the impossibility of conceiving that anyone would endeavour to lie to him either by commission or omission. As Greenslade puts it:
A significant feature of any culture of irresponsibility is to render such irresponsibility "unconscious" -- perhaps as part of the wider pattern identified by John Ralston Saul (The Unconscious Civilization, 1995). It is possibly to be recognized as systemic negligence and necessarily has that consequence.
Those responsible for the governance of Enron were characterized by investigators as indulging in willful blindness. The news organization executives were invited to comment by the Select Committee on the applicability of the term to their attitude to corporate governance. A related term is collective amnesia -- as the report of the previous interview of the executives of that same news organization by the Select Committee concluded in 2003. The phenomenon merits careful attention as previously argued (Pointers to the Pathology of Collective Memory, 1980):
At what point do claims of "being out of touch" and "not knowing what is going on" cease to be credible? In such cases, as with the seeming ignorance of many governance matters by those responsible for the news organization, it is appropriate to ask whether they are competent to govern the organization. How ignorant is it possible to be, and for what period, without jeopardizing the viability of the institution?
It is appropriate to note that, when challenged by UK Parliamentarians, those responsible for the news organization, the UK Prime Minister, and the Metropolitan Police Commissioners all placed great emphasis on the argument that if they had known then what they know now they would then have acted differently. Curiously, both prior to and subsequent to the appointment of Andy Coulson (former editor of News of the World) as his press secretary by the Prime Minister, he only received a minimal security vetting in contrast to the more extensive vetting of his predecessors. As noted by Ian Katz (Andy Coulson vetting saga: damp squib, or dynamite? The Guardian, 22 July 2011):
It's worth remembering that by May 2010, when Cameron and his PR chief arrived in Downing Street, the Guardian had run 91 articles about illegal activities at the News of the World under Coulson, 14 of them on the front page. Never mind the private warnings passed to Cameron's staff by Nick Clegg, Paddy Ashdown and the Guardian.
However, as stressed by the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, it is not sufficient to use the clarity of hindsight to excuse the inadequacy of foresight -- especially if warnings then had been ignored and cautionary briefings then were refused. As he put it:
It's not about hindsight ... It's not about whether Mr Coulson lied to him. It's about all the information and warnings that the PM ignored. He was warned and he preferred to ignore the warnings. (Phone-hacking scandal: Wednesday 20 July 2011, The Guardian, 20 July 2011)
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