Complementary "big lies" -- "pro-peace" and "anti war"?

Time for a Remedial Global Nuclear War? (Part #2)

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One approach is to consider whether society is confronted by "Big Lies" -- two, rather than a single one, as typically argued.

Pro-peace image cultivated by the military: The vast investment in military hardware, its development, and its deployment to multiple bases around the world, are all upheld as being in order to ensure peace and security. Whilst this assumption may be challenged by critics of the military-industrial complex and the pursuit of profit by arms manufacturers, the increasing allocation of resources to that end continues to be stressed as a strategy to ensure the peace to which populations aspire.

An issue for critics is to exactly what threat such military preparedness is addressed. Here it is evident that military proponents of the pro-peace image are attentive to highlighting by every means the nature of threats by other entities -- typically defined as of malign intent, if not of essentially evil nature. The often subtle nature of such threats calls for clarification of what the military posture opposes -- the "anti-what" which is a guarantee of "pro-peace"?

The posture has been criticized as the need for enemies in order to reinforce a tangible sense of collective identity (Needing Evil Elsewhere, 2001). Without problematic enemies, is a collective at risk of losing any sustainable sense of identity and of the relative superiority of its values, especially when their nature is elusive? (Values, Virtues and Sins of a Viable Democratic Civilization, 2022)

Faced with the possible erosion of a sense of identity and coherence, is the collective then obliged to engender enemies justifying a militaristic posture? This may be done deliberately through false flag operations or by other covert means -- eliciting threats to which a response can be justified. (Provocation of "Unprovoked Aggression" by Encroachment, 2022). In an information dependent society, enemies may be variously imagined or asserted to exist -- much as has been done in the past by assertion of the role of "evil spirits".

A feature of this Big Lie is the global institutionalization of the safeguarding of peace in the UN Security Council -- grouping Permanent Members who tend to perceive each other as a primary threat to peace. Ironically those attracted to anti-war activism may themselves be profiled by such authorities as a threat to law and order -- to peace.

Anti-war image cultivated by peace movements: Curiously the pro-peace posture of the military is complemented by an "anti-war" posture by a variety of righteous movements variously successful in mobilizing people momentarily. Historically this was inspired by the Russell-Einstein Manifesto (9 July 1955) -- subsequently the basis for the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.

The current global condition has engendered a sense of urgency in this regard (Caitlin Johnstone, The Historic Urgency for an Anti-War Movement, Consortium News, 1 March 2023; Phyllis Bennis, When the World Said No to War, Counter Punch, 24 February 2023; Anti-war protests in Washington, Munich and Helsinki, Helsinki Times, 22 February 2023).

Somewhat ironically, such movements have their own need for enemies to sustain their sense of identity and the coherence of their values (Chuck Zlatkin, Unifying the Rage Against the War Machine, Consortium News, 15 February 2023; Bernie V. Lopez, Resurrection of the Anti-war Movement, Daily Tribune, 24 February 2023). The military-industrial complex is a natural focus of their concern -- to whatever degree this is transformed into militant activism.

While such anti-war movements may be successful in mobilizing many for massive demonstrations and media exposure, far less evident is their ability to translate this momentary expression of protest into sustainable collective strategies. That such protests serve no purpose is however dismissed as a myth. Just as the military is faced with a fundamental challenge of engendering a credible "anti-what" strategy, the "anti-war" movements have the greatest difficulty in engendering a sustainable consensus on a credible "pro-what" strategy.

The difficulty is exemplified by the simplistic nature of what seems to engender the highest degree of consensus, namely strategies articulated in terms of "stop" -- whether "stop the war", or "stop" some other initiative by questionable others. Missing is widespread consensus on what should be "started" and how to do so -- other than by protesting against those deemed to be undermining that possibility.

How exactly is the "pro-what" nature of society to be envisaged -- assuming the achievement of "peace"? For some this is adequately understood as business-as-usual -- ignoring the multiplicity of problems which render this questionable for many. For others it is a paradigm shift to a new understanding of society and its peoples -- despite its elusive nature and the challenges to its widespread acceptance, however articulated. A stress may be placed on remedial local initiatives, avoiding those of a global nature -- effectively relying on a "trickle-up" effect. Religions have long been faced with such a paradigm shift -- a challenge now faced by science and techno-optimists. Both religions and science continue vigorously to promote belief in the remedial viability of their agendas -- and their unquestionable credibility.

The possibility of coherent consensus has been offered globally by "sustainability" and the UN's 17 Sustainable Development Goals. It is increasingly questionable whether these will ensure the degree of uptake assumed to be possible. Cynics can readily criticize the "development" in question as a deceptive means of creating ever more "fucking opportunities" -- whilst carefully failing to address the problematic consequences of overpopulation in relation to resources, as noted above by Paul Ehrlich.

"Stopping" versus "Starting": There is a further curiosity to the complementarity highlighted above. Whereas the pacifist, anti-war movement is indeed renowned for its initiatives to "stop" war, the militarist mindset is necessarily focused on the "start" of war. Technology has become ever more sophisticated in the detection of any missile launch by which war may be deemed to have been initiated -- requiring an immediate response. The posture is embodied in the acronyms of the succession of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START-I, START-II, START-III, and New START).

Military preparedness has become a significant focus, with personnel oriented to "starting" at any moment -- and possibly welcoming the transition from inaction to purposeful action. This is in striking contrast with the anti-war mindset. There is little insight into what might fruitfully emerge after successfully "stopping". That consideration might even be deemed irrelevant, or simply framed as "anything is better". This is of course inadequate as a response to the array of problems of which war serves as a distracting culmination.

Problematic for both extremes is any gradual process. The gradual transition from a "quick" war to one that develops into one that is drawn out over decades can be held to exemplify military failure and strategic desperation. Vietnam, Afghanistan and Ukraine offer examples. The latter frames the question as to when war has become reality, given the transition through proxy war and the careful pretence of the absence of conflict between Russia and US-led NATO.

A "quick" peace is evident in any "ceasefire" process. Less evident is the gradual shift in attitude from a conflictual posture to one in which a form of peace emerges but without any formal affirmation of the absence of conflict, as through a peace treaty. It is surprising to recognize the number of conflicts which can be considered latent, although little recognition is accorded to them. For example, there has been no peace treaty between North and South Korea since termination of the conflict in 1953; Japan and Russia never signed a formal peace treaty ending World War II hostilities because of a long-running territorial dispute over the islands off Hokkaido. Historical conflict between colonists and indigenous peoples may continue to fester over centuries.

"Big Lie"-complex as a hyperobject: The nature of any Big Lie is such as to render its comprehension extremely challenging. This challenge necessarily extends to a complex of two mutually entangled lies. The challenge is exacerbated by the dynamics within both contexts, as well as between them. A sense of chaos may well be deliberately or inadvertently cultivated by various initiatives.

The complex invites recognition as a hyperobject, as articulated from the perspective of object-oriented ontology (OOO) by Timothy Morton (Hyperobjects: philosophy and ecology after the End of the World, 2013;  Introducing the Idea of 'Hyperobjects': a new way of understanding climate change and other phenomena, High Country News, 19 January 2015). For Morton, a hyperobject is held to be of such vast temporal and spatial dimensions in relation to human life that it defeats traditional ideas about what is indicated -- an association with references to hyperreality.

Whether such recognition is helpful is another matter, given the challenge articulated by Stafford Beer:

Le Chatelier's Principle: Reformers, critics of institutions, consultants in innovation, people in sort who "want to get something done", often fail to see this point. They cannot understand why their strictures, advice or demands do not result in effective change. They expect either to achieve a measure of success in their own terms or to be flung off the premises. But an ultrastable system (like a social institution)... has no need to react in either of these ways. It specialises in equilibrial readjustment which is to the observer a secret form of change requiring no actual alteration in the macro-systemic characteristics that he is trying to do something about (The Cybernetic Cytoblast: management itself. Chairman's Address to the International Cybernetics Congress, September 1969)

Embracing error? If there is merit to controversial recognition of the framing of complementary "big lies", it can then be asked whether the two constituencies are capable of admitting any "error" in their respective worldviews. Does each necessarily consider itself to be "right" -- with the other as necessarily "wrong"? This is the pattern reviewed by Edward de Bono as inhibiting fruitful lateral thinking (I Am Right and You are Wrong, 1968).

An alternative perspective is offered by Donald N. Michael, as "the requirement to embrace error" (Learning to Plan and Planning to Learn, 1997):

More bluntly, future-responsive societal learning makes it necessary for individuals and organizations to embrace error. It is the only way to ensure a shared self-consciousness about limited theory on the nature of social dynamics, about limited data for testing theory, and hence about our limited ability to control our situation well enough to be successful more often than not.

From that perspective it could be asked whether institutions such as the UN or the Club of Rome have proven themselves capable of recognizing any error in decades of strategic analysis -- in the light of criticism -- and of then "embracing" it in "future-responsive societal learning", as suggested by Michael (Club of Rome Reports and Bifurcations: a 50-year overview, 2018). The question can be addressed to think tank reporting more generally in the light of their highly conflictual relationships (Tank Warfare Challenges for Global Governance, 2019).

The problematic denial of error, accompanied by blame-games, is especially evident at the national level, with striking examples:

• Iraq: Twenty years after the invasion of Iraq, controversy still rages over the existence of the "weapons of mass destruction" (WMDs) which provided the UK's justification for taking part (How the search for Iraq's secret weapons fell apart, BBC, 13 March 2003)
• Afghanistan: (A "Strategic Failure": Assessing the Administration's Afghan Withdrawal, House Republican Interim Report, August 2022; Pentagon audit: Afghanistan War a $145 billion 'Vietnam' failure, Washington Examiner, 16 November 2022; Veterans give searing testimony on US withdrawal from Afghanistan at hearing, The Guardian, 10 March 2023; 20 years in Afghanistan: Was it worth it? BBC, 17 April 2021)
• Slavery: Although former colonial powers have declared the slavery in which they engaged to be illegal, this has not translated into any admission of error justifying reparations (The case for British slavery reparations can no longer be brushed aside, The Guardian, 10 July 2020; Reparations for slavery in the United States)

The pattern is evident, and presumably reinforced by denial of error by religions over centuries.

A difficulty shared by the mutually challenging pro-peace and anti-war perspectives is that of "nation building" -- on a global scale -- whether after war, or after its successful prevention.

It is such conflictual relationships which are neglected in optimistic strategic proposals in response to the "crisis of crises" in the quest for a safe operating space for humanity (Recognizing the Psychosocial Boundaries of Remedial Action, 2009). Ungovernability and indifference to strategic analysis can be seen as engendered by the immediate challenges posed by increasing population and the progressive erosion of coping capacity (Indicators of Political Will, Remedial and Coping Capacity? 2019; Ungovernability of Sustainable Global Democracy? 2011).

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