Process of helicopter development: getting off the ground

Engendering a Psychopter through Biomimicry and Technomimicry (Part #6)

---

[Parts: First | Prev | Next | Last | All] [Links: To-K | From-K | From-Kx | Refs ]

---

If the next phase of psychosocial evolution implies "getting off the ground" -- out of the dinosaur mode -- there is a case for exploring biomimicry and technomimicry together as a source of learning. Especially relevant to any such exploration is the history of the development of the helicopter. The point to be made is that it is not the final operational product which merits as much attention as the process through which it emerged -- not the solution but the learning process.

The well-documented history of helicopter development is striking because it was absolutely unclear what  needed to be learned  and understood (see Helicopter History Site; History of the Helicopter: Igor Sikorsky and other early pioneers). Especially valuable is the study by Frank Ross (The History of Helicopters, extracted from his Flying Windmills: the story of the helicopter, 1953).

Whilst the primitive nature of the early experiments with airplane development over a century ago are reasonably familiar through photographs, those relating to the helicopter are less well-recognized -- especially since some of the histories omit critical phases in the process. However, what is less clear from these histories is not what was learned, as understood and explained after the fact, but how it was learned -- through what inspiration. What were the special insights involved in understanding how to take off vertically and then move horizontally to a new location?

As noted and illustrated by J. Gordon Leishman (A History of Helicopter Flight, 2000, extracted from his Principles of Helicopter Aerodynamics, 2000), the six fundamental technical problems recognized as limiting early experiments with helicopters were [with comments added here, as indents, relative to possible psychosocial analogues]:

1. Understanding the basic aerodynamics of vertical flight: The theoretical power required to produce a fixed amount of lift was an unknown quantity to the earliest experimenters, who were guided more by intuition than by science. While basic theories describing the operation of thrusting rotors had been established by the end of the nineteenth century by William Rankine (1855), W. Froude (1878) and R. E. Froude (1889), the first significant application of aerodynamic theory to helicopter rotors came about in the early 1920s.

   What needs to be understood with respect to psychosocial evolution and "escape" from the currently "grounded" condition? How are the questions to be formulated? Where are clues to be found -- as separately explored (Functional Complementarity of Higher Order Questions: psycho-social sustainability modelled by coordinated movement, 2004; Navigating Alternative Conceptual Realities: clues to the dynamics of enacting new paradigms through movement, 2002)

2. The lack of a suitable powerplant (engine): This was a problem that was not to be overcome until the beginning of the twentieth century by the development of internal combustion (gasoline) powered engines. Yet, it was not until the mid-1920s that engines with sufficient power and with the high power to weight ratios suitable for vertical flight became more widely available.

   How is the nature of the "engine" to be understood? What enables "lift-off"? How is this to be distinguished from "hot air" ballooning so characteristic of contemporary governance -- as discussed separately (Globallooning -- Strategic Inflation of Expectations and Inconsequential Drift, 2009)

3. Minimizing structural weight and engine weight:Early power plants were made of cast iron and were relatively heavy. Aluminum, a common material used on modern aircraft, was not available commercially until about 1890, but even then was inordinately expensive. Aluminum was not widely used in aeronautical applications until 1920.

   Is the excess "weight" to be usefully understood in terms of inherited "baggage" and habitual patterns which it has proven difficult to discard? Is metaphorical use of "heavy" and "lighten up" helpful in this respect? Is it a question of "bigness" as discussed with respect to dinosaurs and multinationals (Systemic Biomimicry of Dinosaurs by Multinational Corporations, 2011)

4. Counteracting rotor torque reaction: The idea of a tail rotor to counter torque reaction and provide directional control was not used on most early designs. Most early machines were built with either coaxial or laterally side-by-side rotor configurations. Yet, building and controlling two rotors was even more difficult that for one rotor. Igor Sikorsky was the first to successfully use the tail rotor in the single rotor helicopter configuration we know today.

   Could this be usefully understood in terms of reactionary spin or a dysfunctional critical response -- perhaps to be recognized in terms of "twistedness", as separately discussed (Engaging with Questions of Higher Order: cognitive vigilance required for higher degrees of twistedness, 2004)

5. Providing stability and properly controlling the machine: A primary concern was to devise a means of defeating the unequal lift produced on the blades advancing into and retreating from the relative wind when in forward flight. These were problems that were only to be fully overcome with the use of blade articulation in the form of flapping and lead/lag hinges, ideas that were pioneered by Cierva, Breguet, and others, and with the development of blade cyclic pitch control.

   Is stability to be understood in the light of resilient response to potentially disruptive psychosocial cycles, but more especially to the challenge of the longer-term adaptive cycle -- as highlighted by the Resilient Alliance ***

6. Conquering the problem of high vibrations: Vibration was a source of many mechanical failures of the rotor and airframe, and reflected an insufficient understanding of the dynamic and aerodynamic behavior of rotating-wings.

   Are high "vibrations" to be understood in terms of rapid shifts of (public) opinion associated with excesses of certainty/uncertainty or hope-mongering/doom-mongering? Does this call for a new kind of engagement with time (Strategic Embodiment of Time: configuring questions fundamental to change, 2010)

---

[Parts: First | Prev | Next | Last | All] [Links: To-K | From-K | From-Kx | Refs ]