In quest of a "meta-model": engaging in a meta-modelling process?

Epistemological Panic in the face of Nonduality (Part #2)

From "gods" to "theories": In rejecting religion in favour of science, it might be assumed that humanity was relieved of its dysfunctional engagement with a vast array of "gods". Wikipedia offers comprehensive listings of deities of the different religions, cultures and mythologies of the world (see also Michael Jordan, Encyclopedia of Gods: over 2,500 Deities of the world, 1993). H. L. Mencken (Memorial Service) offers a list of some 500 "dead gods". He indicates that: They were gods of the highest standing and dignity -- gods of civilized peoples -- worshipped and believed in by millions. Many of them are mentioned with fear and trembling in the Old Testament. Appropriate sacrifices were of course made to many of them at the instigation of their priesthoods. Some even mediated an evil "dark force".

Curiously humanity is now obliged to engage with a vast array of "theories" -- a "pantheon" of theories to which other kinds of sacrifice are also made (for the natural sciences, see Robert E. Krebs, Encyclopedia of Scientific Principles, Laws, And Theories, 2008). As with the gods, many are "incommensurable", claiming exclusive purview within the worldview within which they expect belief. But, as with the gods, many are now "dead". Most might be expected to be declared "dead" at some time. Where once some were theories of the highest standing and dignity -- a framework of belief for civilized peoples of any intelligence -- any credence now given to them is deprecated (and indicative of a "bad career move"). For those still attracting believers, there is an extensive literature on the challenges of incommensurable theories.

String theory as nec plus ultra: The challenge has been highlighted in the case of the quest to produce a unified explanation of physics -- fundamental to a coherent understanding of how the Universe works. Much enthusiasm has been associated with the potential of string theory in response to the difficulties of the Standard Model and in an effort to move beyond it. Superstring theory is now dominant in physics. However, for one commentator (Jim Holt, Unstrung: in string theory, beauty is truth, truth beauty -- is that really all we need to know? The New Yorker, March 2006):

For more than a generation, physicists have been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp called string theory. The beginning of this chase marked the end of what had been three-quarters of a century of progress. Dozens of string-theory conferences have been held, hundreds of new Ph.D.s have been minted, and thousands of papers have been written. Yet, for all this activity, not a single new testable prediction has been made, not a single theoretical puzzle has been solved. In fact, there is no theory so far -- just a set of hunches and calculations suggesting that a theory might exist. And, even if it does, this theory will come in such a bewildering number of versions that it will be of no practical use: a Theory of Nothing.

The focus on beauty is consistent with that of Christopher Alexander (mentioned above). In a review of string theory and its potential, Peter Woit (Not Even Wrong: the failure of string theory and the continuing challenge to unify physics, Jonathan Cape, 2006) explains that "superstring theory" really refers not to a well-defined theory, but to unrealized hopes that one might exist. As a result, this is a "theory" that makes no predictions, not even wrong ones, and this very lack of falsifiability has allowed it not only to survive but to flourish -- as the nec plus ultra of human reflection on the nature of the Universe.

Conceptual arrogance: The cognitive value for humanity of string theory -- in comparison with the demonstrable viability of quarrelsome religions and their leadership (in defiance of lack of falsifiability) -- is perhaps highlighted by Woit's statement (in a concluding chapter On Beauty and Difficulty) that:

There is often a somewhat intellectually macho attitude among some mathematicians, an attitude that, since they overcame great hurdles to understand something, there's no reason to make it easier and encourage others less talented and dedicated than themselves. However, this sort of arrogance among mathematicians pales in comparison with the degree of arrogance one sometimes encounters among superstring theorists. They often seem to be of the opinion that only real geniuses are able to work on the theory, and that anyone who criticises such work is most likely just too stupid and ignorant to understand it. There is a striking analogy between the way superstring theory research is pursued in physics departments and the way postmodern "theory" has been pursued in humanities departments....The barriers to understanding that this kind of work entails make it very hard for any outsiders to evaluate what, if anything, has been achieved. (pp. 206-207)

Presumably superstring theory will eventually be superseded if physicists are to have continuing scope for fundamental physics -- an issue of "job security"? Like one of the gods of yore, it will be "dead".

The problem for individuals and for global society will however remain. What will enable a more appropriate engagement with their universe -- if not with the Universe? By deliberately disassociating the psychosocial processes of physics (especially as quarrelsome eccentric geniuses of competing schools of thought) from what calls for "explanation", the incomprehensible complexity of any emergent Theory of Everything will only be matched by its irrelevance. Indeed a Theory of Nothing -- but of little value.

With respect to current challenges of climate change science (and scientists), George Monbiot (The Trouble with Trusting Complex Science, The Guardian, 8 March 2010; also syndicated under the title The Unpersuadables: when facts are not enough) argues that:

Scientific specialisation is now so extreme that even people studying neighbouring subjects within the same discipline can no longer understand each other. The detail of modern science is incomprehensible to almost everyone, which means that we have to take what scientists say on trust. Yet science tells us to trust nothing, to believe only what can be demonstrated. This contradiction is fatal to public confidence.

Monbiot made a further point, consistent with the remarks above regarding the poorly recognized prevalence of "the dark":

But there's a deeper suspicion here as well. Popular mythology - from Faust through Frankenstein to Dr No - casts scientists as sinister schemers, harnessing the dark arts to further their diabolical powers. Sometimes this isn't far from the truth. Some use their genius to weaponise anthrax for the US and Russian governments. Some isolate terminator genes for biotech companies, to prevent farmers from saving their own seed. Some lend their names to articles ghostwritten by pharmaceutical companies, which mislead doctors about the drugs they sell.

In explicitly reinforcing Monbiot's argument regarding the extent to which scientists seek to deceive, Nicholas Maxwell (author of From Knowledge to Wisdom: a revolution for science and the humanities, 2007), makes a further point with regard to physics:

Physics only ever accepts theories that are unified - that attribute the same laws to all the phenomena to which the theory in question applies - even though many empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted. This means that physics persistently accepts a substantial thesis about the universe independent of evidence: there is some kind of underlying unity in nature, to the extent at least that all seriously disunified theories are false. This substantial, influential and highly problematic assumption needs to be acknowledged within science, so that it can be criticised and, we may hope, improved. The aim of science is not truth per se, but rather truth presupposed to be unified, or explanatory. (Scientists should stop deceiving us, The Guardian, 12 March 2010)

Missing is any exploration or understanding of the variety of ways in which knowledge might indeed be "unified" -- as with ensuring the "coherence" of any collective initiative or sense of personal integrity. This was a specific concern of the Integrative Knowledge and Transdisciplinarity Project, which profiled some 600 understandings.

Comparable psychosocial challenges: Irrespective of the challenge of the relationships between rival string theories, and the potential of superstring theory itself, the situation regarding any "unified" understanding of the Universe is analogous to that to be found in relationships between:

the disciplines, various interdisciplinary processes, and aspirations to a unifying transdisciplinarity
the religions, various interfaith processes, and aspirations to a meaningful global ethic and unifying spiritual understanding
the cultures and ethnic groups, various multicultural processes, and aspirations to some form of unity in diversity
the political ideologies, various multipartisan initiatives, and aspirations to viable forms of global governance
the languages, various multilingual contexts, and aspirations to coherent communication reflecting the range of epistemological perspectives

These are of course old challenges, variously formulated and variously addressed. One can go questing for a Functional Synthesis of Viewpoints (1968) and embody the aspiration in a Functional Classification in an Integrative Matrix of Human Preoccupations (1982) as used to order thousands of profiles of problems and strategies in an online Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential. But the challenge of the incommensurable and associated disagreement remains (and was in fact designed into that compilation). Repeating the concluding point of Nicholas Rescher (The Strife of Systems: an essay on the grounds and implications of philosophical diversity, 1985):

For centuries, most philosophers who have reflected on the matter have been intimidated by the strife of systems. But the time has come to put this behind us -- not the strife, that is, which is ineliminable, but the felt need to somehow end it rather than simply accept it and take it in stride.

What might "take it in stride" mean in cognitive practice -- especially given the insightful use of that metaphor by Francisco Varela (Laying Down a Path in Walking: essays on enactive cognition, 1997) Is this a model of the transdisciplinary process as previously explored (Transcending Duality as the Conceptual Equivalent of Learning to Walk, 1994; Walking Elven Pathways: enactivating the pattern that connects, 2006)?

Characteristics of a meta-model: The question is what kind of "meta-model" is capable of encompassing both cognitive incommensurables at any one time and the dynamics of the emergence and passing away of frameworks, whether understood as "revolutions" (Kuhn), the process of conjecture and refutation (Popper), or some form of process reality (Whitehead)? And how might individuals and society engage cognitively and in practice with such a "meta-model"?

Where is the research on disagreement and the hazards of handling incommensurables -- rather than seeking to eliminate them in tokenistic, reconciliatory "tolerance"? Does the absence of such research figure appropriately in some meta-model? Or, rather than pursuing a mythical model regarding the nature of any universe, how might an "ecology" of belief systems be fruitfully understood -- given the challenge of understanding "nature" itself? Some previous thoughts include:

The ecology of cultures was notably the focus of a recent conference (Cultural Clashes: social construction and cultural ecology, Poznan, 2008) addressing global flows of peoples and information, cultural conflict, competing paradigms of knowledge, ideological differences and potentials for dialogue.