Embodiment of Change: Comprehension, Traction and Impact? (Part #2)
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Perhaps the most fundamental question is why so many well-intentioned initiatives can only be said to have been less than successful in terms of the challenges experienced now as well as those to be anticipated (if only in that their nature cannot necessarily be foreseen). There is a need to learn from the seeming inadequacy of the collective learning process, as suggested by Donald Michael (
Learning to Plan and Planning to Learn, 1997). What might be required by such collective "meta-learning" -- especially in a group context in which so many acclaimed approaches to dialogue facilitation have proven problematic in their own right?
A particular concern is the appropriateness of assumptions made about "change" and how "traction" is to be achieved -- especially when there is a tendency to use conventional marketing and military metaphors in the quest for widespread "impact" and "visibility" as being the criterion of success. What undermines the capacity of a self-selected group to elucidate and deliver meaning appreciable by others? From what does the indifference of others derive? Why do they variously engage with other preoccupations?
The relatively new term "psychic numbing" is used to describe the tendency of people (potentially as voters) to feel less urgent compassion and contribute less, when the suffering is shown to be more systemic and more pervasive, especially when described as affecting larger numbers of people. The observer experiences a sense of powerlessness and helplessness -- a sense that nothing in the world will change that particularly broad, complex situation (Paul Slovic, "If I look at the mass I will never act": Psychic numbing and genocide, Judgment and Decision Making, 2007; J. E. Roberston, 'Psychic Numbing': Why does mass suffering induce mass indifference?, 15 August 2010). This is consistent with the distinction between problem assessment and assessment of remedial capacity (Remedial Capacity Indicators Versus Performance Indicators, 1981).
Several factors are implicit in the questions raised by the documents listed below:
- questionable reliance on an implicit "vision" metaphor in "envisaging" future strategy -- when other senses ("hearing", "taste", "smell", "touch", etc) clearly serve a purpose in navigation, whether or not their merits are employed in policy metaphors in "recognizing the elephant in the room" (Strategic Challenge of Polysensorial Knowledge: bringing the "elephant" into "focus", 2008).
- rapidly diminishing attention span (individually or collectively) in combination with information overload and the unquestioning reliance on the integrative capacity of communication technology -- suggesting an imminent "singularity" (Emerging Memetic Singularity in the Global Knowledge Society, 2009)
- radical differences in logical preferences and orientations undermining conventional expectations of rationally coherent outcomes (Systems of Categories Distinguishing Cultural Biases, 1993). For example, to what extent do the personality/cognitive styles of participants at the World Economic Forum "explain" the differences in the policies they favour from those of the World Social Forum?
- unquestioning self-confidence (even self-righteousness) of those subscribing to certain belief systems and worldviews -- necessarily defensive or condescending in their relationship with others (Guidelines for Critical Dialogue between Worldviews, 2006; Dynamically Gated Conceptual Communities: emergent patterns of isolation within knowledge society, 2004). This typically includes those who "know" what needs to be done, if only others could "see" the validity of the argument.
- existence of "no go" topics, systematically avoided even though relevant to any viable future intiative (Global Strategic Implications of the "Unsaid": from myth-making towards a wisdom society, 2003; Lipoproblems: Developing a Strategy Omitting a Key Problem -- the systemic challenge of climate change and resource issues, 2009; Overpopulation Debate as a Psychosocial Hazard: development of safety guidelines from handling other hazardous materials, 2009)
- inability to question whether any one "perspective", however eminent the authority, is capable of encompassing the meta-challenge -- complemented by inability to question current capacity to interrelate a requisite variety of "perspectives" such as to engender more widely communicable insight. There is no context for such discourse and no sense of its potential outcome.
- increasing lack of confidence in authorities, especially those having agendas with political, socio-economic or religious implications -- as evidenced by the aftermath of the financial crisis, the climate change debate, or "zero risk" reports on the "safety" of nuclear installations (Credibility Crunch engendered by Hope-mongering, 2008; Abuse of Faith in Governance, 2009)
- increasing impatience of those with capacity to act irrespective of the above considerations -- by whomever, and however frequently, they are formulated. The challenge is then framed as relatively simple, requiring only the particular skills of those who claim to understand the problem, focused in a readily comprehensible way -- a "silver bullet" enabling a "logjam" of complexity to be released. Terrorism, geoengineering and nuclear energy offer examples (Promoting a Singular Global Threat -- Terrorism: strategy of choice for world governance, 2002; Geo-engineering Oversight Agency for Thermal Stabilization (GOATS), 2008).
- increasing recognition of the paradoxical nature of the strategic dilemma and the psychosocial implication of those wanting to act and/or challenged by how they are entangled in it -- as characterized by the insights of such as Douglas Hofstadter (I Am a Strange Loop, 2007), Steven M. Rosen (Topologies of the Flesh: a multidimensional exploration of the lifeworld, 2006) or George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Philosophy In The Flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought, 1999). These imply the possibility of "new thinking" of strategic relevance (Consciously Self-reflexive Global Initiatives: Renaissance zones, complex adaptive systems, and third order organizations, 2007; Engaging with Globality through Knowing Thyself: Embodying engagement with otherness, 2009; Sustaining a Community of Strange Loops: comprehension and engagement through aesthetic ring transformation, 2010).
The challenge has been well framed by Albert Einstein:
The significant problems we face can not be solved at the same level of thinking
we were at when we created them.
To repeat the same thing over and over again,
and yet to expect a different result, this is a form of insanity.
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